Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee

By Biao Xie, Wallace N. Davidson, Peter J. DaDalt. 2003

2,869 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/844cf76fb462e17b1fd50b726b05f4fd19dd6eab

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Citations in the corpus

The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2014, background): “market and demonstrates that accrual-based earnings management can be constrained by a larger number of independent board members and higher quality of audit committees (Beasley, 1996; Chang & Sun, 2009; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003).”
Corporate Governance and Value in Brazil (and in Chile) (2005, background): “Xie et al. (2003) find that the composition and the qualification of board and committee members are associated to less earnings management.”
Corporate governance and earnings management at large U.S. bank holding companies (2009, background): “Xie et al. (2003) examine discretionary accruals from a corporate governance perspective in a cross-”
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: Jordanian Evidence (2011, background): “Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003), Sonda et al. (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005) provided evidence concerning board independence and earnings manipulation and found that companies with independent boards are less likely to report abnormal accruals.”
The Impact of Audit Committee Existence and Audit Committee Meeting Frequency on the External Audit: Perceptions of Australian Auditors (2007, background): “been operationalised as the number of committee meetings held during the financial year (Song & Windram, 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Abbott et al., 2003; Xie et al., 2003), with the expectation that, the more often a committee meets, the more likely it is to carry out its duties.”
Surplus Free Cash Flow, Earnings Management and Audit Committee (2009, background): “Managers' behaviour of obscuring the real performance through earnings management may create agency costs such as costs to undo the managed earnings, to resolve misallocations of resources, or to seek for other information (Xie et al., 2003).”
Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan (2016, background): “Correspondingly, Xie et al. (2003) find a negative relationship between board independence and the extent of earnings management.”