Law and Social Norms

By R. Slovenko. 2002

302 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/82a67b954e764a562c38c6164e468486f2ca779b

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Does brand management of corporate reputation translate into higher market value? (2010, unknown): “Marti & Balboa, 2003 ; Padilla, 2003 ; Posner, 2000 ).”
Signaling can increase consumers' willingness to pay for green products. Theoretical model and experimental evidence (2019, unknown): “Therefore, individuals who have an incentive to be perceived as trustworthy in public (such as politicians) engage in demonstrative cooperative behavior (Posner, 2000).”
Social Norms: A Review (2016, unknown): “From a legislative perspective, social norms can be conceptualized as an efficient alternative to legal rules because they guide against negative externalities and provide social signals at little or no cost (Ellickson & Ellickson, 2009; Posner, 2009).”
The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) Know? (2012, background): “While it must be clear to taxpayers what the rules of the game are and as deterrence measures serve as signals for the tax morale a society wants to elicit (Posner 2000a, b), deterrence could also crowd out the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.”
Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China’s Transitional Economy1 (2004, background): “A large part of our social and economic life is governed by informal norms (North 1994; Ellickson 1991; Posner 2000; Nee and Ingram 1998).”
Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third‐Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game (2005, background): “When Schelling (1960) introduced the idea of focal points, he emphasized that this aspect of game theory was inherently empirical, dependent as it is on the shared knowledge and cultural understandings of those in the game.”
Social Capital and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Bank Loans and Public Bonds (2017, unknown): “…cooperative norms, while dense social networks intensify the external social sanctions (Coleman (1988)) such as social ostracism (Uhlaner (1989)) and stigmatization (Posner (2000)), and heighten negative moral sentiments such as guilt and shame associated with perpetrating opportunistic behaviors.”
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent (2006, unknown): “…compliance with the law (Ellickson 1991, Tyler 1990).1 In addition to the direct deterrent effects of legal sanctions, various indirect ways of how lawmaking may affect behavior have been suggested (Cooter 1998, McAdams 2000a, Posner 1998, 2000, Posner and Rasmusen 1999, Sunstein 1996, 1999).”
Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economy: Methods, Problems and Open Questions (2013, unknown): “It must be clear to taxpayers what the rules of the game are and as deterrence measures serve as signals for the level of tax morale a society wants to elicit (Posner, 2000), deterrence may also crowd out the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.”