Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights and Firm Diversification: An Empirical Analysis

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Is Earnings Management Opportunistic or Beneficial? An Agency Theory Perspective (2008, unknown): “Jiraporn et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis 17 (2008) 622–634”
The cost of pride: Why do firms from developing countries bid higher? (2011, unknown): “4 Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler (1992), and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) provide many useful references to this literature.”
Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidence (2014, methodology): “That is, weak shareholder rights mean greater managerial power (Klock et al., 2005; Chava et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2005; Jiraporn et al., 2006; Dittmar and MahrtSmith, 2007; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007).12 Firms whose shareholder rights are more suppressed are more likely to experience a wider…”
Capital Structure and Corporate Governance Quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) (2012, unknown): “…2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Park et al., 2008), costs of debt financing (Cremers et al., 2007), corporate diversification (Jiraporn et al., 2006), cash holding (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007), debt maturity structure (Harford et al., 2008), CEO compensation (Fahlenbrach,…”
Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure (2008, unknown): “30 These governance scores are described in detail in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Jiraporn et al. (2006).”