Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure

By Ole‐Kristian Hope, Wayne B. Thomas. 2008

662 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0d42de7f06450d19a96a239a91121647630edfe8

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Citations in the corpus

The cost of pride: Why do firms from developing countries bid higher? (2011, neutral): “…becoming an important way to enter foreign markets by firms from developing and transition economies.3 Between 1987 and 2005, the share of developing and transition economies in global cross-border M&A activity rose from 4% to 13% in value terms, and from 5% to 17% in terms of the number of deals.”
How Does Financial Reporting Quality Relate to Investment Efficiency (2009, positive): “…contribute to a growing body of literature that studies relations between financial reporting quality and investment (e.g., Bens and Monahan, 2004; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Bushman et al., 2006; Beatty et al., 2008; Francis and Martin, 2008; Hope and Thomas, 2008; McNichols and Stubben, 2008).”
Financial credibility, ownership, and financing constraints in private firms (2011, neutral): “Wang (2008), and Hope et al. (2009), among others.”
Tax Avoidance and Geographic Earnings Disclosure (2013, positive): “Hope and Thomas (2008) find that managers conceal geographic earnings information to grow foreign operations in order to expand the total size of the " empires " they manage.”
Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China (2012, background): “(2007) and Hu and Zhou (2008) offer evidence that firms show better performance when their managers takes equity stakes.”
Does the Diversification–Firm Performance Relationship Change Over Time? A Meta‐Analytical Review (2018, positive): “First, changes in factor markets, specifically a general shift in the balance of power from managers towards shareholders (Kochan and Useem, 2010; Useem, 1993), and other capital market pressures, have curbed the ability of managers to engage in managerial empire building (Hope and Thomas, 2008).”
The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs (2012, neutral): “…“empire building”, which refers to managers’ tendencies to grow the firm beyond its optimal size or to maintain unutilized resources with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Masulis et al. 2007; Hope and Thomas 2008).”