Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure

By Gregory S. Miller. 2002

596 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/805c7083825a507dc3abb0fc37148b393f0f5f00

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Citations in the corpus

Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits (2017, unknown): “First, we follow Mooney and Duval [1993] and perform 50 bootstrapped replications for the main specification with the three voluntary disclosure measures.”
Louis Working Paper Series Beyond the Numbers : An Analysis of Optimistic and Pessimistic Language in Earnings Press Releases (2006, unknown): “%) is consistent with prior research (e.g., Hoskin et al. (1986) find 31% of their sample earnings releases include management forecasts while Miller (2002) finds, depending on firm performance, between 30% and 48% of his sample includes management forecasts).”
Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance (2005, unknown): “…(Harper 2003).13 In addition, prior studies have generally found a positive association between performance and disclosure (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Miller 2002), suggesting that poor performance may at least partially explain a firm’s decision to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance.14 12…”
Assessing Financial Reporting Quality of Family Firms: The Auditors’ Perspective (2015, unknown): “7 For instance, because disclosure quality is higher for firms with superior performance (Miller 2002), and family firms are associated with superior performance (Anderson and Reeb 2003), family firms are expected to be associated with superior reporting and disclosure quality.”
Evidence on the Information Content of Text in Analyst Reports (2014, background): “First, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) propose that analysts are especially important in propagating bad news because managers push out good news as fast as possible, but are less forthcoming with bad news (Miller 2002; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009).”
Motives for disclosure and non-disclosure: a framework and review of the evidence (2006, unknown): “price using disclosures Miller (2002) studies a sample of firms who start off with unambiguously good news; in particular, they have enjoyed an extended period of seasonally adjusted earnings increases.”
The informativeness of earnings and management's issuance of earnings forecasts (2006, unknown): “Management forecasts are often issued with supplementary disclosures that improve the credibility of earnings forecasts (Miller, 2002; Hutton et al., 2003; Baginski et al., 2004).”
Shareholder Litigation and Changes in Disclosure Behavior (2009, unknown): “Because disclosure is correlated with economic performance (Miller, 2002), changes in disclosure relative to the damage period may simply reflect how a constant disclosure strategy produces disclosures that vary with different economic outcomes, rendering a comparison of β1 to β4 difficult to interp”
Private Earnings Guidance and its Implications for Disclosure Regulation (2007, unknown): “Miller (2002) examines the relation between firm performance and voluntary disclosure in a sample of firms with sustained increases in earnings performance.”
Narrative Disclosure and Earnings Performance: Evidence from R&D Disclosures (2014, unknown): “with Miller (2010)’s conclusion that small investors find it too costly to process information in”
Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Roles: A Topic Modeling Approach (2018, unknown): “Empirical studies generally support this theory (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Miller 2002; Chen et al. 2011).”