Selection Bias, Demographic Effects and Ability Effects in Common Value Auction Experiments

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Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, unknown): “literature (Chen et al., 2005; Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007). Casari et al. (2007) , for”
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study (2010, background): “In fact, the majority of studies in the auction literature that consider gender effects find that women overbid more than men, suggesting more competitive behavior once in a competition (Chen et al., 2005; Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007; Charness and Levin, 2009).”
A comprehensive comparison of students and non-students in classic experimental games (2015, background): “In a binary trust experiment very similar to ours, Casari et al. (2007) report that 73 percent of their student subjects (designated as trustors) trusted by investing.”
Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Ham and Kagel (2006) and Casari et al. (2007), for example, find that women overbid more than men in common value auctions.”
Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE (2015, background): “Casari et al. (2007) observed that participants who made more money in a common-value auction experiment were more likely to sign up for a further auction experiment.”