Inferring the goals of a nonhuman agent

By Susan C. Johnson, Amy E Booth, K. O'Hearn. 2001

174 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f963fbfa7c7a4f5393e69cc038111aaf78fc104

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Developmental and Educational Psychology

In Social Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Is agency skin-deep? Surface attributes influence infants' sensitivity to goal-directed action (2004, background): “For one, from the earliest months of life, infants are sensitive to the rich perceptual attributes of real-world agents (in particular, people), including facial configurations (M. Johnson, 1992 ), biological patterns of motion (Bertenthal, 1993), and the sounds they produce (Spelke, 1976).”
Helping and Cooperation at 14 Months of Age. (2007, result): “First, with regard to the motivational aspect of helping, these results speak in favor of the view that an altruistic motivation is already apparent early in human ontogeny, complementing research on empathy (e.g., Eisenberg, 1992; Hoffman, 1981, 2000 ).”
Psychological Reasoning in Infancy. (2016, background): “Similarly, in attention-following tasks, 12-month-olds turned in the same direction as a point-light human in an upright position (Yoon & Johnson 2009) or as a novel rounded entity with a face and fur ( Johnson et al. 2001).”
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts (2004, background): “They found that the infants made communicative gestures to the orangutan, but not to a grossly similar object that lacked eyes and contingent interaction (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 652).”
A Computational Model of Social-Learning Mechanisms (2009, background): “…how young children represent and imitate others’ actions in terms of intended goals comes from their ability to socially learn complete actions which they have only seen partially demonstrated, because of mistakes or inability of the demonstrator (Johnson, Booth, & O’Hearn, 2001; Meltzoff, 1995).”
Abstraction Levels for Robotic Imitation: Overview and Computational Approaches (2010, background): “Several other studies address the general problem of understanding the process of inferring the goal/intention behind a demonstration [14, 67, 91].”
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition (2005, background): “…– as evidenced by the fact that when they observe unsuccessful actions they imitate not those specific movements but rather they make at- tempts to reproduce the actor’s desired result in the environment using novel actions (Bellagamba & Tomasello 1999; Johnson et al. 2001; Meltzoff 1995).”