Bureaucrats, State Banks, and the Efficiency of Credit Allocation: The Experience of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

By Robert J. Cull, Lixin Colin Xu. 2000

223 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7ed3e8f5c9b628d6455b3c29903b1d05be06e248

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Citations in the corpus

To what extent did the economic stimulus package influence bank lending and corporate investment decisions? Evidence from China (2018, background): “In the Chinese capital market, bank loans are the main source of external finance for corporations, due to the underdeveloped stock and bond market (Cull and Xu, 2000; Firth et al., 2008).”
Formal Versus Informal Finance : Evidence from China (2008, unknown): “Cull and Xu (2000, 2003) focus only on the state sector in China using data on Chinese state-owned enterprises from 1980 to 1994 and find that even in the state sector, bank financing was associated with higher productivity, profitability, and adoption of reforms compared to government transfers.”
Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms (2005, unknown): “…by the main (and largely state-owned) banks in China, and recent empirical research shows that state banks have grown increasingly inefficient in allocating credit as they have been increasingly forced to bail out poorly performing state-owned enterprises (Lardy, 1998; Cull and Xu, 2000, 2003).”
State-Owned Enterprises Going Public: The Case of China (2004, unknown): “Its predecessors, covering the periods from 1980-1989 and 1990- 1994, have been used by previous researchers (Groves et al., 1994; Li, 1997; Xu, 2000; Shirley and Xu, 2001; Cull and Xu, 2000).”
Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market (2011, background): “Given that banks' equity stakes are usuallymuch smaller than the notional value of their loans to listed companies (Cull and Xu, 2000), banksmay choose to influence corporate executives and play less effective monitoring if they are concerned with the security of their loans or aim to obtain better…”
Ownership, Investment Climate and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Firms (2006, unknown): “…enterprises, and the general lack of confidence that the Chinese state-owned banking sector does a good job in allocating bank loans (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2004; Cull and Xu, 2000, 2003), it is unlikely that we shall find a strong positive contribution of the banking sector to firm performance.”
Association Between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism (2010, unknown): “We measure discretionary accruals, DACC, as the residual from the modified Jones model, adjusted by a performance matched firm (Dechow et al. [1995], Kothari et al.”
Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences (2015, unknown): “Second, firms with high government ownership are subject to a ‘soft budget’ constraint, suffer the burden of pursuing social objectives and enjoy easier access to credit from state-owned banks (Lin and Tan, 1999; Cull and Xu, 2000).”
The Impact of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions on Local Economic Growth in China (2010, background): “allocate the capital to profitable state-owned enterprises ( Cull and Xu (2000) ), bank”
Institutions, ownership structures, and distress resolution in China☆ (2013, background): “Cull and Xu (2000) document that financial development aligns firm actions with market mechanisms by screening debtors and by making market-driven, instead of policy-driven, loans.”
State Ownership, Soft-Budget Constraints, and Cash Holdings: Evidence from China's Privatized Firms (2014, unknown): “In fact, Cull and Xu (2000) document that state-owned banks in China give preferential treatment to distressed state-owned firms when allocating credits, while tolerating late or omitted payments on existing loans.”