Institutions, Ownership, and Finance: The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms
By Robert J. Cull, Lixin Colin Xu. 2005
1,026 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2a9ad03df51e794c03a1208f2c896e06dec81e45
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Omrane Guedhami
- Chen Lin
- Thorsten Beck
- Walid Saffar
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Robert J. Cull
- Allen N. Berger
- Narjess Boubakri
In Finance
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Thorsten Beck
- Chen Lin
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Allen N. Berger
- Robert J. Cull
- Franklin Allen
- Omrane Guedhami
In Strategy and Management
- Omrane Guedhami
- Walid Saffar
- Narjess Boubakri
- Chen Lin
- R. Duchin
- D. Sosyura
- Dev R. Mishra
- Mara Faccio
Citations in the corpus
- Political connections of newly privatized firms (2008, background): “Specific-country studies like Johnson and Mitton (2003) in Malaysia, Cull and Xu (2005) in China and Khwaja and Mian (2005) in Pakistan, and cross-country studies like Faccio et al. (2006), and Faccio (2006b) show that politically-connected firms have higher leverage ratios than their nonconnected c”
- Do R&D tax incentives work? Firm-level evidence from China (2017, background): “…treatments in the world.5 However, China's institutional environment for firm innovation remains underdeveloped due to such problems as its poor property rights protection, weak contract enforcement and heavy government intervention (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; Cull & Xu, 2005; Du, Lu, & Tao, 2015).”
- Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross‐Country Analysis (2010, background): “Academic studies reporting evidence on how connections provide sources of value have identified only a few differences between connected and nonconnected firms, such as preferential access to credit (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Chiu and Joh, 2004; Dinç, 2004; Cull and Xu, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005),”
- Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits (2015, background): “Cull and Xu (2005) find that in regions with less-developed markets and weaker legal systems, firms are more likely to have politically connected CEOs and directors.”
- China's Great Economic Transformation: China's Financial System: Past, Present, and Future (2007, positive): “Cull and Xu (2005) find that firms in most regions and cities rely on courts to resolve less than 10% of business-related disputes (the highest percentage is 20%), with a higher reliance on courts in coastal and more developed areas.”