Does Shareholder Composition Matter? Evidence from the Market Reaction to Corporate Earnings Announcements

By Edith S. Hotchkiss, D. Strickland. 2003

212 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7e1288af87d8d7b750a77ba7aac23a51bab7271c

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Citations in the corpus

Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies (2013, unknown): “Finally, we measure the investor horizons of firms by aggregating the ownership of their long-term investors.7 We measure an investor’s investment horizon as the investor’s portfolio turnover (e.g., Barber and Odean (2000), Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003), and Gaspar et al. (2005)).”
The Persistence of the Accruals Anomaly (2006, unknown): “Other studies (e.g., Cready 1994; Hotchkiss and Strickland 2003 ), however, use several of these variables as controls for the change in institutional ownership.”
Market Reaction to Verbal Components of Earnings Press Releases: Event Study Using a Predictive Algorithm (2006, unknown): “Hussainey et al. (2003) use keywords associated with forecasts and predictions to quantify the number of sentences in annual reports dealing with forward-looking statements, which increase the relationship between current stock returns and future earnings changes.”
Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “Similarly, Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) reported that the composition of shareholding was influenced by earning announcements, and not vice versa.”
Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons (2013, background): “Although their importance in equity markets has increased, institutional investors are far from an homogeneous group (e.g. Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003).”
Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation (2006, background): “Consistent with this view, Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) report that the market reaction to negative earnings announcements is stronger in firms with greater institutional ownership.”
The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation (2013, unknown): “We follow Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) to construct a vector of control variables, X, which includes: (1) the magnitude of unexpected earnings (ForecastError), which is the difference between the reported quarterly earnings and the consensus analyst forecast (the median analyst forecast over the ”
Investors' Horizons and the Amplification of Market Shocks (2013, background): “Furthermore, Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) show that investors’”