The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation

By Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, S. Chomsisengphet, Douglas D. Evanoff. 2011

723 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6a0ba098d038d90e92630cdf2b30a31a2537aa2b

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Citations in the corpus

Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows (2011, background): “This approach also helps alleviate the endogeneity concern (Lin et al., 2011).”
Mortgage Market Design (2012, neutral): “Several recent papers compare modi cation rates and outcomes for securitized and directly held mortgages (Adelino et al. 2009, Agarwal et al. 2011, Foote et al. 2010, Piskorski et al. 2011).”
Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (2015, positive): “This evidence is consistent with Agarwal et al. (2012), who find that mortgage modification programs, when used with sufficient intensity, may improve a range of economic outcomes.”
Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt (2012, result): “27 These results are consistent with Lin et al. (2011), who examine empirically the effects of excess control rights on borrowing costs but take the ownership structure to be exogenous.”
Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt (2013, background): “…even after controlling for several variables that influence the cost of debt.5 Furthermore, when the control-ownership divergence is controlled for so as to separate out the effect of ownership structure (Lin et al., 2011a), the effect of group affiliation becomes even greater (62 basis points).”
Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy (2014, neutral): “Third, by automatically reducing mortgage rates, ARMs may help alleviate the barriers to loan renegotiation due to securitization (Piskorski et al. 2010; Agarwal et al. 2011) and lender concerns regarding borrowers’ strategic behavior (Mayer et al.”
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt (2013, neutral): “To take the propping incentives into consideration and check the robustness of our main results, we follow the recent ownership literature (Lin et al., 2011) and construct two measures to proxy for a borrowing firm’s potential of being propped up.”
Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market: Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries (2015, positive): “In particular, we employ the state regulator leniency index of Agarwal et al. (2014). We find no clear evidence of a relationship between states with softer banking regulators and the degree of misrepresented loans.”
Securitization and Mortgage Default (2011, neutral): “Agarwal et al. (2012) use fixed-rate loans from LPS and other data sets to study the determinants of the securitization decision and the performance of loans securitized by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and privatesecuritized loans, relative to those held in ”