Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in Power Systems

By Yanling Yuan, Zuyi Li, Kui Ren. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011

517 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Civil and Structural Engineering, Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4b9f24756463763d170e96addb13e9e3e90e5805

How researchers see this paper

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In Civil and Structural Engineering

Prateek Mittal

In Computer Networks and Communications

In Control and Systems Engineering

Citations in the corpus

Model-Based Attack Detection and Mitigation for Automatic Generation Control (2014, background): “In [16], the impact of load redistribution attacks on state estimation is presented.”
EPPA: An Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Aggregation Scheme for Secure Smart Grid Communications (2012, unknown): “Cyber security is of paramount importance in smart grid as communications are deeply involved in its operations [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13].”
Smart Grid — The New and Improved Power Grid: A Survey (2012, unknown): “Security [7, 19, 50] [164, 162, 250] Privacy [177, 45, 64, 79] [121, 147, 140, 143] [162, 207] Monitoring and Measurement [21, 55, 152] [222, 261, 268] Information Transmission [59, 241, 158] [128, 142]”
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, background): “[30], [31], where only load bus power injection”
BlackIoT: IoT Botnet of High Wattage Devices Can Disrupt the Power Grid (2018, background): “Power systems’ vulnerability to failures and attacks has been widely studied in the past few years [14, 17, 18, 23, 54].”
Defending Against False Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation (2017, background): “A more practical assumption is that whether or not a meter measurement could be compromised by an adversary dose depend on the defense budget deployed by the defender on the meter.”
A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems (2017, background): “[31] which can affect the power grid operation by attacking the security-constrained economic”
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges (2013, background): “Targeted systems Impact References DC SCADA Invalid state estimation [39] [41] [43] [40] AC SCADA Invalid state estimation [42] [52] [59] Electric market Potential financial losses [58] [57] be authenticated to the communication networks or the grid, and have the access to sensitive information.”