Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service
By C. De Persis, Pietro Tesi. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2015
1,347 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54af38adc6dc2f58756f329f43eae6c41187b8a8
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In Computer Networks and Communications
In Control and Systems Engineering
Citations in the corpus
- Resilient Event-Triggered Controller Synthesis of Networked Control Systems Under Periodic DoS Jamming Attacks (2019, methodology): “later) generates the time sequence {tkh}k∈N, the triggered state data can be transmitted to the controller successfully, and the control signal can also be safely received by the actuator [18]”
- Optimal Denial-of-Service Attack Scheduling With Energy Constraint Over Packet-Dropping Networks (2018, methodology): “To preserve input-to-output stability (ISS) of the closde-loop system under DoS attacks, Peris and Tesi [14] restricted frequency and duration of DoS attacks, and different control update laws under the restricted DoS attacks were provided to achieve ISS.”
- Switching-Like Event-Triggered Control for Networked Control Systems Under Malicious Denial of Service Attacks (2020, methodology): “Similar to [12], we also denote the sequence of DoS from OFF to ON as {hn}, which represents the communication is possible.”
- Resilient Control Design Based on a Sampled-Data Model for a Class of Networked Control Systems Under Denial-of-Service Attacks (2019, background): “Remark 1: Recalling some existing results on DoS attacks, the objective is to design a sampling logic in [34] or a proper sampling period T 0 in [33] for a given stabilizing controller such that the stabilizing controller is robust to DoS attacks.”
- A Survey on Security Communication and Control for Smart Grids Under Malicious Cyber Attacks (2019, background): “is easy to see that the communication scheme in [13] is only a special case of conditions in [54].”
- Distributed Resilient Observer-Based Fault-Tolerant Control for Heterogeneous Multiagent Systems Under Actuator Faults and DoS Attacks (2020, background): “Lemma 4 ([17]): If there exists a W (x(t)) > 0 and scalars α > 0 and β > 0 such that 1) Ẇ (x(t)) < βW (x(t)) for t ∈ ΠD(0,∞) 2) Ẇ (x(t)) < −αW (x(t)) for t ∈ ΠN (0,∞) then”
- Resilient Event-Triggering $H_{\infty }$ Load Frequency Control for Multi-Area Power Systems With Energy-Limited DoS Attacks (2017, methodology): “In the literature, there are some nice results on the cyber-security under DoS and deception attacks [12], [14], [16].”
- Input-to-State Stabilizing Control for Cyber-Physical Systems With Multiple Transmission Channels Under Denial of Service (2018, methodology): “Thispaperinvestigatestheinput-to-statestabilizingcontrolproblem forCPSswithmultipletransmissionchannelsunderDoSattacksand study[14]canbeviewedasaspecialcaseofthispaper.”
- A systems and control perspective of CPS security (2019, methodology): “Resilience, the property by which the maximum damage inflicted by the attack is contained, has been demonstrated in many papers using methods such as [15], [100], [132].”
- Event-Triggered $H_\infty$ Load Frequency Control for Multiarea Power Systems Under Hybrid Cyber Attacks (2019, background): “As stated in [15], there are various types of DoS attacks, such as trivial, periodic, random, and protocol-aware jamming attacks.”
- Resilient control under Denial-of-Service: Robust design (2016, methodology): “Following [13], we consider a general DoS model that constrains the attacker action in time by only posing limitations on the frequency of DoS attacks and their duration.”
- Observer-Based Event-Triggered Control for Networked Linear Systems Subject to Denial-of-Service Attacks (2020, methodology): “In general, in order to proof the existence of the positive lower bound of the interevent time interval, we usually need complicated calculations by adopting the method proposed in [11] or make an assumption that there exists a positive lower bound for the interevent time as in [28].”