Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators' Judgments of Witness Reliability
By K. Ask, Pär Anders Granhag. 2007
126 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7c69b02fae6e1e83ee57b6a0f63d9a2d70db52e8
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
In Social Psychology
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- The truth about lies: What works in detecting high‐stakes deception? (2010, background): “…Copyright © The British Psychological Society Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society leading to progressively irrational judgments about the defendant and possibly guilt presumption (Ask & Granhag, 2007; Meissner & Kassin, 2002).”
- Dangerous decisions: the impact of first impressions of trustworthiness on the evaluation of legal evidence and defendant culpability (2010, background): “Ask and Granhag ( 2007 ) found that criminal investigators have a tendency to be more sceptical about evidence that runs counter to their ori ginal perception than evidence consistent with that perception.”
- Credibility of the emotional witness: A study of ratings by police investigators (2008, background): “External factors such as time pressure, prestige concerns and cultural norms, create biases in police officers’ interrogation and investigation (Ask & Granhag, 2005 , 2007 ; Kassin et al, 2003 ), and prior knowledge or expectations about the victim might bias the questioning.”
- Dangerous decisions: A theoretical framework for understanding how judges assess credibility in the courtroom (2009, background): “In a study of criminal investigators, Ask and Granhag (2007) found strong support for this ‘asymmetrical scepticism’, the tendency to be more sceptical about evidence that runs counter to one’s prior belief than evidence consistent with the belief.”