Strategy and Dynamics in Contests

By Kai A. Konrad. 2009

960 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7ab6cb1db3b6038aa68982e9ce2727f0d88d27b4

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Citations in the corpus

Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests (2011, background): “Third, it compares the two most widely studied types of contest success functions (all-pay-auctions and logit 2 Notably these actions include their efforts, Congleton, Hillman and Konrad (2008), Konrad (2009) and to their decisions to enter the contest, Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2008).”
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis (2011, background): “Aview of how uncertainty may affect contest outcomes is through heterogeneous abilities or valuations by contestants (and asymmetric uncertainty regarding them; see, for example, Konrad 2009, Terwiesch and Xu 2008).”
Persuasion as a contest (2008, unknown): “As discussed in detail in the survey by Konrad (2009), in the case of contest success functions, there are three types of derivations: axiomatic (Bell et al. 1975; Skaperdas 1996; Clark and Riis 1998), stochastic (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992, p.380 and Jia 2008), and those with microfoundations on…”
Contest functions : theoretical foundations and issues in estimation (2013, background): “This class has been employed in a number of fields, including in the economics of advertising (Schmalensee, 1972, 1978), sports economics (Szymanski, 2003), rent-seeking (Nitzan, 1994; Tullock, 1980), as well as contests in general (Konrad, 2009).”
Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China (2018, unknown): “…upon previous studies on tournament as an incentive scheme in a single-layered organization (Tullock, 1980; Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Konrad, 2009).8 Finally, we provide new insights to understand role of local leaders’ political incentives in China’s economic development.”
Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (2015, unknown): “The main reason is that group contests employing the lottery CSF usually have pure strategy equilibria, making it easier for subjects to learn and for researchers to analyze the data, while contests employing the auction CSF have only non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibria (Konrad, 2009).”
Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “(2012) and for a review of the theoretical literature see Konrad (2009).”
Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “These environments have attracted the attention of many prominent theorists and have yielded a number of interesting theoretical predictions; for a comprehensive review of theoretical literature see Konrad (2009).”
Sabotage in contests: a survey (2015, background): “Partial reviews of sabotage behavior, as parts of longer reviews, are provided by (Konrad 2009, Chapter 5.3), on the theoretical literature, and by (Dechenaux et al. 2012, Chapter 6.1), on the experimental literature.”
A generalized Tullock contest (2011, background): “Endnotes 1 Contests are characterized by three attributes such as prizes, players, and the efforts of the players (Konrad 2009). 2 In a first-price all-pay auction the winner is the player who expends the most effort (Baye et al. 1996). 3 Chung (1996) is among the first to consider spillover/externa”
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “They have also been studied extensively by economic theorists in what has become known as the field of contest theory (Konrad 2009).”