Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy

By Torsten Persson. 2001

333 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a9c3c7055d877db330dcbaf846472b8dda4f2b8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Constitutions and the resource curse (2008, background): “For a brief overview of this literature s main predictions and ndings, see Persson (2002).”
The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world (2007, neutral): “For the positive link between a negative income shock and government spending as a share of GDP, see Persson (2002).”
Innovation-driven industrial green development: The moderating role of regional factors (2019, neutral): “Government-scale (GS) is measured by the proportion of public expenditure to GDP (Aidt and Jensen, 2009; Persson, 2002) and enterprise-scale (LnES) is measured as the log transform of the average sales revenue per industrial enterprise, both used as threshold variables.”
Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect (2003, background): “In evaluating the impact of political institutions on policies, Torsten Persson (2002) forcefully demonstrates that constitutional controls of the parliament reduces government spending by approximately 10 percent.”
On Local Housing Supply Elasticity (2008, neutral): “The approach has proved to be a fertile one in several fields, such as public finance (Persson, 2002), law and economics (Djankov et al.2003), finance (Laporta et al, 2005, Djankov et al. 2007), and economic growth and development (Barro, 2006, Djankov, 2007).”
Why Doesn't the US Have a European-Style Welfare System? (2001, neutral): “18 See also Persson (2001).”
Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers (2005, neutral): “shares predicted under the SSPE in the BF games, which is consistent with the large body of experimental data from alternating-offer bilateral bargaining games (Roth, 1995). However, in this case it is not so much what the average base player is willing to accept that is responsible (as the average ”
ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, neutral): “More recently, Persson (1999, 2002) and Persson et al. (2000) offer further broad 34Multivariate analysis probably serves as a proxy for appropriate methodological and specification sophistication.”
Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? (2006, positive): “In their influential studies, Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2005) outline the mechanisms through which electoral systems influence fiscal outcomes and report on the empirical strength of these mechanisms.”
Political Institutions and Policy Volatility (2004, positive): “The vast literature on political determinants of budget deficits [see Persson and Tabellini (1999) for a recent review] that posits that countries with a larger number of policy-makers will have a more difficult time allocating costs (tax revenue) but will be more likely to generate policy logrolls ”
Cyclical Ratcheting in Government Spending: Evidence from the OECD (2004, neutral): “Persson (2001) found a ratcheting effect in parliamentary systems.”
Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence, and discretion (2010, neutral): “In particular, while Persson (2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2001) ﬁnd that, in general, parliamentary and majority based systems are re-lated to cyclicality of ﬁscal policy, Alesina et al. (2008) found that most of the pro-cyclicality of ﬁscal policy in developing countries can be explained by…”