Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect

By Thomas Plümper, Christian Martin. 2003

220 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3b767184bb8c50d81336fbe9d811f04d465592c7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. T. Bernauer
2. M. Baettig
3. Andrew Williams
4. Abu Siddique
5. Marina Povitkina

In Political Science and International Relations

1. M. Baettig
2. Andrew Williams
3. Abu Siddique
4. T. Bernauer

Citations in the corpus

• On the measurement of political instability and its impact on economic growth (2009, unknown): “However, as illustrated in the previous section, this dimension also reflects the presence of democracy (or lack thereof) and there is some recent evidence suggesting that democracy has a positive impact on economic growth (see, e.g. Plümper and Martin, 2003).”
• National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? (2009, background): “…von Stein, and Gartzke 2008; and Neumayer 2002+ 9+ See, for example, Dorussen and Ward 2008+ 10+ See Ross 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al+ 2001; and Plümper and Martin 2003+ 11+ See, for example, Busch 2000+ 12+ See Ward 2008; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; and Li and Reuveny 2006+ 13+ See Roberts,…”
• The use (and abuse) of governance indicators in economics: a review (2008, background): “This score increases (that is, the constraints get larger) as the branches of government become less aligned with the executive.5 Papers to have used this version of constraints include Aghion and Alesina (2004), Mobarak (2005), and Plumper and Martin (2003), among others.”
• Earthquake propensity and the politics of mortality prevention (2010, unknown): “…for example, argue that the larger is the “selectorate”, the group f people who select the government, the more difficult it is for the government to use targeted payoffs to remain in power and the more likely the government will rely on public goods instead (see also Plümper and Martin 2003).”