The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats

By Canice Prendergast. 2007

465 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/78dfbee51c7d703e2fd1739a541ad0330094e3b2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management (2008, background): “As (32) and (35) imply that both elements in q(E,M) increase with α, and q(E,M) is increasing in α for given E and M , it follows that output increases in α.”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, background): “But as a small theoretical literature in economics [e.g., Delfgaauw and Dur (2007), Francois (2000), and Prendergast (2007)] has pointed out, offering higher wages may come at the cost of attracting individuals who are more corruptible or care less about the mission.”
Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, unknown): “Prendergast (2007) begins from the premise that providing monetary incentives for " bureaucrats " is difficult.”
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, background): “Focusing on civil service jobs, Prendergast ð2007Þ shows how it can be op- 38 In Thanassoulis ð2013Þ, competition also works by raising managerial rents ðthere is no ex ante adverse selection, hence no designing of contracts to attract or retain talentÞ: the disutility of effort increases through…”
The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies: Recent Contributions, New Insights, and Areas for Further Research (2010, background): “…2018 democracy and autocratic regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), but also between different electoral systems, such as proportional versus majority-rule systems (Rogowski and Kayser 2002; Roelfsema 2004), and the autonomy given to bureaucrats and implementing institutions (Prendergast 2007).”
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems (2010, background): “…and through their identification with the goals of the principal or organization, they are also more likely to take actions that are favorable to the interests of the principal (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Murdock, 2002; Prendergast, 2007; Van Slyke, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008).”
Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model (2010, unknown): “On related grounds, see also Prendergast (2007).”
Opinions as Incentives (2009, background): “The optimality of having an adviser whose interim preferences are different from the DM’s is reminiscent of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Prendergast (2007), but the frameworks and forces at work are 30 A related point is made by Hori (2008), who considers an agent hired to advise a principal…”