Competition and microfinance

By Craig McIntosh, B. Wydick. 2005

414 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7832db4d2d0e6dfcf5858b33ae4f2f13c3e34ae6

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Citations in the corpus

Credit Information Systems in Less Developed Countries: A Test with Microfinance in Guatemala (2007, background): “Recent findings report that greater competition among lenders has increased problems of borrower overindebtedness, reduction of loan repayment incentives, and growing arrears for microfinance institutions (MFIs) in competitive environments (Campion 2001; McIntosh and Wydick 2005).”
Microfinance and the Challenge of Financial Inclusion for Development (2013, background): “An extension of this argument (McIntosh and Wydick 2005) is that as competition results in reduced returns from more profitable borrowers, it leads to the exclusion of poor borrowers, thereby undermining the supposed focus of microfinance in serving the underserved poor.”
How Rising Competition Among Microfinance Institutions Affects Incumbent Lenders (2005, background): “A different strategic problem under negative-only sharing is presented by McIntosh and Wydick (2004). If there is asymmetric information as to borrowers’ total indebtedness levels, lenders who coexist with other credit suppliers will be unable to gauge risk in lending accurately.”
Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries (2005, neutral): “…competition between potential financial providers may end up ‘crowding out’ or shrinking the size of financial markets (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991; Kranton and Swamy 1999; Hoff and Stiglitz 1997; Navajas, Conning, and Gonzalez-Vega 2003; Wydick and Mcintosh 2004; Jain 1999; 68 Ray and Sengupta 1989).”
Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions (2012, neutral): “However, McIntosh and Wydick (2005) show that competition among non-profit lenders exacerbates asymmetric information problems regarding borrower indebtedness and causes more borrowers to seek additional debt, thus creating a negative externality that leads to worse loan contracts for all borrowers.”
Do regulated microfinance institutions achieve better sustainability and outreach? Cross-country evidence (2007, background): “…specific organizations have been successful both prior to and after becoming regulated, recent theoretical work has pointed out that competition has changed the landscape of microfinance and that donor support only for commercialized and regulated MFIs may be misguided (McIntosh and Widyck, 2005).”
On mission drift in microfinance institutions (2011, neutral): “3 See, for example, Mosley (1996), Armendáriz-Morduch (2005), and Cull et al (2008).”
Do microfinance institutions accomplish their mission? Evidence from the relationship between traditional financial sector development and microfinance institutions’ outreach and performance (2013, background): “This has led to competition between banks and MFIs (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005 ).”
Islamic Banking Sustainability: A Review of Literature and Directions for Future Research (2016, background): “Despite the possibilities of attaining both financial sustainability and outreach at the same time (Cull, DemirgüçKunt, and Morduch 2007; McIntosh and Wydick 2005; Mia and Chandran 2016; Nurmakhanova, Kretzschmar, and Fedhila 2015; Quayes 2012), most of the banks are prioritizing the former rather…”
The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information (2010, background): “Such moral hazard might arise from risky project selection (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999), shirking in project implementation (Conning, 1999), or from hidden outside debt in the presence of incomplete contracting (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005).”
Banks and Microbanks (2009, positive): “Coupled with the decline in repayment rates, this suggests that lenders are not able to identify a borrower’s total outstanding indebtedness, an information problem emphasized in McIntosh and Wydick (2005). However, repayment rates do not decline in districts with higher education levels, consistent”
Competition and the performance of microfinance institutions (2013, neutral): “Research has shown that increased loan supply may lead to multiple-loan taking (referred to as ‘doubledipping’ in the literature) by clients, resulting in heavy debt burdens and low repayment rates (see, e.g. McIntosh and Wydick, 2005; McIntosh et al., 2005).”
Performance and governance in microfinance institutions (2009, background): “This can reduce outreach, and Berger and Udell (1998) confirm this for smaller firms, and McIntosh and Wydick (2005) do likewise for MFIs.”