Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision

By Martin F. Hellwig, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2002

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/77ee0080922199591f3d34e20946968850aa85e7

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In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Estimating processes in adapted Wasserstein distance (2020, background): “The work of Hellwig [19] was motivated by questions of stability in dynamic economic models/games; see [24, 35, 20, 8] for further research in this direction.”
Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers (2003, unknown): “Holmstrom and Milgrom's work has been considerably extended by Sung [26] and by Hellwig and Schmidt [14].”
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model (2004, unknown): “See also Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) for a generalization of this model.”
The Wasserstein space of stochastic processes (2021, methodology): “We list Aldous extended weak topology [5] (stochastic analysis), Hellwig’s information topology [38, 39] (economics), Bion-Nadal and Talay’s version of the Wasserstein distance [23] (stochastic analysis, optimal control), Pflug and Pichler’s nested distance [62, 63] (stochastic optimization), Rüsche”
The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “However, this seems to occur in only highly stylized settings (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Hellwig and Schmidt, 2002).”
Optimal Compensation with Hidden Action and Lump-Sum Payment in a Continuous-Time Model (2009, background): “Different variations and applications of the problem are considered in [3, 7, 8, 14, 21, 23, 28, 29]. See also [18, 19], and [ 11 ].”
A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent (2005, background): “When Wt 2 (W ; Wgp); ( 8 ) implies that 1=u0(c) = F 0(W ): Let us show that F 0(W ) has”
All adapted topologies are equal (2019, background): “The work of Hellwig [31] was motivated by questions of stability in dynamic economic models/games; see the related articles [40, 59, 32, 11].”