Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility of Big 4 versus Non‐Big 4 Audits: Evidence from Anglo‐American Countries

By Inder K. Khurana, K. K. Raman. 2004

845 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7790845f9da33d759197c9f0bbf3712274ef310f

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Citations in the corpus

Culture and auditor choice: A test of the secrecy hypothesis (2008, background): “Litigation is thus likely to be more costly for Big 4 firms in terms of the potential impairment to their brand name reputation capital in which they have invested more (Palmrose, 1988; Khurana and Raman, 2004).”
Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality? (2010, methodology): “These control variables (BM through REC_RET) are based on prior research (e.g., Khurana and Raman 2004, 2006) and are defined in Table 1 panel C. Consistent with Fama and French (1997), we control for the book-to-market ratio (variable BM) as an equity risk factor.”
Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals (2009, neutral): “Sinason and Pacini (2000) and Khurana and Raman (2004) reach a similar conclusion from wider samples.”
The effect of accounting comparability on the accrual-based and real earnings management (2016, background): “Studies also show that high quality audits play a similar role, especially in countries with strong legal regimes, to restrict insiders’ incentives to rely on AEM in order to conceal their pursuit of private control benefits (Khurana and Raman, 2004; Francis andWang, 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2016).”
Audit Quality, Earnings Management, and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from India (2017, background): “…have examined the effect of audit quality on financial reporting credibility in a range of countries (Teoh & Wong, 1993; Becker et al., 1998; Khurana & Raman, 2004; Weber, Willenborg & Zhang, 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Cameran et al., 2015), the results cannot be generalized to a country such…”
Ownership concentration in privatized firms: The role of disclosure standards, auditor choice, and auditing infrastructure (2006, background): “Khurana and Raman (2004) document that, unlike in the U.S., investors in Australia, Canada, and the U.K. do not reward firms retaining a Big Five auditor with lower financing costs.”
Corporate Life Cycle and Cost of Equity Capital (2015, background): “Using a sample of Australian firms, Khurana and Raman (2004) find that the mean cost of equity, estimated by the PEG (Easton, 2004) model, is 10.3% and 10.7% and that the median cost of equity is 9.1% and 9.7% for the firms audited by Big and non-Big Auditors, respectively.”
The Economic Determinants of Conditional Conservatism (2009, neutral): “…litigious environment with a well-founded legal system, strong legal investor protection for creditors and shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1998, 1999), and low costs associated to naming public defendants (Stice, 1991; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Khurana and Raman, 2004).”
The market reaction to Arthur Andersen's role in the Enron scandal: Loss of reputation or confounding effects? (2008, background): “Some studies suggest this insurance demand for auditing dominates reputation concerns (Lennox, 1999; Khurana and Raman, 2004 ), while other studies conclude it is difficult to distinguish between reputation and insurance effects (Baber et al., 1995; Franz et al., 1998).”
Directors׳ and officers׳ liability insurance and the cost of equity☆ (2016, background): “Prior literature suggests that cross-country variation in shareholder litigation threat affects the cost of equity (Hail and Leuz, 2009; Khurana and Raman, 2004).”
How Do Various Forms of Auditor Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from China (2012, background): “As prior literature (e.g., Francis et al., 2003; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Francis and Wang, 2008) suggests, auditors may be more sensitive to the cost of client misreporting and are more likely to maintain audit quality as institutional regimes become stronger.”