Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals

By Lee M. Dunham. 2009

384 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f38baf032fd03ae01db568765f550210bff4b88b

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Citations in the corpus

Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “The outsize number of detected fraud cases in recent years has led to regulatory changes, as well as to growing interest in the determinants and prevention of fraud due to the high costs to market participants (e.g., Ball, 2009; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Kedia and Philippon, 2009).”
Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, neutral): “the efficiency of the financial markets (Ball, 2009), and has extremely negative consequences for firms. For example, announcements of fraud can dramatically affect firm value. Chen et al. (2005) report that firms can lose, on average, 15% to 25% of their value as a result of enforcement actions tak”
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Analysis (2011, positive): “The ambition to succeed in the stock market may have stemmed from the large portfolios of stocks and options held by the management and the associated incentives, or, in Ball’s (2009) view, from management’s desire to be celebrities.”
Do Social Ties between External Auditors and Audit Committee Members Affect Audit Quality (2016, background): “1996; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Hribar and Collins 2002), we follow Ball’s (2009) advice to avoid the limitations inherent in gauging earnings management with discretionary accruals by focusing on more extreme forms of corporate misreporting that violate generally accepted accounting principles (Miller”
Trust and stock price crash risk: evidence from China (2017, background): “, 2014 ), and nonfinancial motivations such as reputation mainenance ( Ball, 2009 ). When bad news withholding and accumulaion reach a threshold level and all of the bad news suddenly beomes publicly accessible, the stock price crashes. Empirical evience supports managers’ bad news hoarding behavior”
The Impact of Forensic Accounting on Fraud Detection (2013, background): “The first decade of the twen y-first century experienced a tsunami‖ or blizzard‖ in the number of corporate scandals, frauds, and filures (Ball, 2009).”
Global Accounting Convergence and the Potential Adoption of IFRS by the United States: An Analysis of Economic and Policy Factors (2009, background): “These legislative bodies have a longstanding tradition of intervening with financial reporting, most prominently in times of crisis (e.g., Zeff, 2003a, 2003b; Ball, 2008).”
Institutional Investor Stability and Crash Risk: Monitoring versus Short-Termism? (2013, background): “Ball (2009) argues that empire building and maintaining the esteem of one’s peers motivate managers to conceal bad news. Kothari et al. (2009) argue that managers will leak or reveal good”
Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, methodology): “These include Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Lambert (1996), Ball (2001), Barth et al. (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001), Holthausen and Watts (2001), Watts (2003a, b, 2006), Schipper (2005), and Barth (2006). Rather than provide a chronological survey of the literature, we build on these reviews by embe”
Financial Reporting Opacity and Expected Crash Risk: Evidence from Implied Volatility Smirks (2014, background): “…specified in compensation contracts, to boost the value of management-held stocks and stock options, to improve management career prospects, to avoid debt covenant violations or debt downgrading, and to hide fraud, for example, stolen assets, including cash (Ball 2009; Kothari et al. 2009).”
Stock Liquidity and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, background): “management to conceal bad news from the market in order to preserve inflated share prices (Ball (2009), Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009)). As unfavorable information accumulates and eventually reaches its upper limit, it is revealed at once, leading to large stock price declines. We examine the rela”
Short interest and stock price crash risk (2015, background): “Ball (2009) argues that empire building and maintaining the esteem of one’s peers motivate managers to conceal bad news.”