Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes

By Richard Snyder, Ravi Bhavnani. 2005

232 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6f34e4b9b38d37422849bfa8b2307b8199d6c11b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. E. Papyrakis
2. F. van der ploeg
3. Erwin H. Bulte
4. Anke Hoeffler
5. Christa N. Brunnschweiler
6. Paul Collier
7. G. Hilson
8. Michael L. Ross

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Erwin H. Bulte
2. E. Papyrakis
3. Michael L. Ross
4. Christa N. Brunnschweiler
5. Anke Hoeffler
6. G. Hilson
7. Paul Collier
8. A. Rosser

Citations in the corpus

• Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict (2005, background): “Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) explain essentially the same choice between looting and growth in terms of the relationship between state capacity and alluvial diamonds.”
• The political economy of the resource curse : a literature survey (2006, background): “…poor development performance, they should have been asking what political and social factors enable some resource abundant countries to utilise their natural resources to promote development and prevent other resource abundant countries from doing the same (Schrank 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005).”
• Masters of their domains: The role of state capacity in civil wars (2010, background): “In fact, Snyder & Bhavnani (2005) extended the lootable resource theory by looking at the capacity of the state to extract revenue and maintain future tax revenues.”
• Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions (2011, background): “…mineral wealth could foster conflicts by funding rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); weakening state institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005); making the state a more attractive target for rebels (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); facilitating trade shocks (Humphreys,…”
• Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars (2008, background): “Similarly, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) argue that diffuse diamonds undermine government institutions by making tax collection extremely difficult, whereas point diamonds consolidate them.”
• Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia (2013, background): “[85] Snyder, Richard, and Ravi Bhavnani.”
• Resource abundance and economic growth in the United States (2007, background): “Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) argue, for instance, that the ability of rulers to sustain political order in developing countries depends on the ratio of taxable non-lootable income to appropriable resource wealth.”
• The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources (2011, unknown): “…mineral wealth could foster conflict by funding rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), by weakening state institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005) and by making the state a more attractive target for rebels (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), to name just a few; see Ross (2006)…”
• Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? (2006, background): “In addition to further theorizing and empirical testing, another task for future research concerns how a political economy of extraction perspective can be integrated with and strengthen existing models of the initiation of civil war ( Snyder and Bhavnani 2005 ).”