Friend or Foe? The Role of State and Mutual Fund Ownership in the Split Share Structure Reform in China

By Michael Firth, Chen Lin, H. Zou. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2010

259 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66e3a2eaa5486ca186285b43d35a9807fbe87fb1

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of State Ownership on Share Price Informativeness: The Case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2012, methodology): “The region classification is based on Firth et al. (2006), which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1.”
The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance (2012, background): “…(Dum_ST ) because ST …rms are subject to additional oversight by the stock exchanges; and the percentage of shares held by mutual funds (%Inst) as Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010) argue that institutional investors (who hold tradable shares) are more likely to be persuaded or coerced into accepting…”
Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “[2012] and Firth et al. [2013] document that through their trading commission fees in the brokerage firms, mutual funds put pressure on these firms’ sell-side analysts to issue optimistic opinions to support their stock positions.”
The Development of China's Stock Market and Stakes for the Global Economy (2017, background): “Firth et al. (2010) consider a di↵erent angle and show that the compensation ratio is increasing in state ownership and decreasing in mutual fund ownership.”
Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in emerging markets: Evidence of a split-share structure reform in China (2015, background): “22 Consistent with Firth et al. (2010), our results imply that state shareholders may exert political pressure on domestic institutional investors to lower compensation ratios.”
The real effect of partial privatization on corporate innovation: Evidence from China's split share structure reform (2020, background): “Firth et al. (2010) find that state and mutual fund ownership have contrasting effects on the compensation ratio.”
Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “Recent theoretical development and empirical studies in corporate governance have examined settings with more than one large blockholder, which allow some level of contestability to emerge on the basis of coalitions formed among the large shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzen, 2000; Laeven and Levin”
China's Secondary Privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform (2014, background): “Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010) report the negative effects of state-ownership and mutual fund ownership on consideration.”
Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud (2010, background): “(2005) and Firth et al. (2010). Likewise, the damaged credibility could also prevent fraudulent firms from getting loans from banks, which are concerned about the accuracy of their accounting statements.”
Acquisition Announcements and Stock Market Valuations of Acquiring Firms’ Rivals: A Test of the Growth Probability Hypothesis in China (2011, unknown): “…run event study analyses to measure Chinese stock market reactions and found significant cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates during short event windows (e.g. Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang, 2010; Chen et al., 2005; Firth, Lin, and Zou, 2010; Miller et al., 2008; Zou et al., 2008).”