Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight Federal Funds Market

By Craig Furfine. 2001

355 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7494d2320543bf89529bdf70381bc68ea8334821

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role of the Board of Directors (2008, background): “Information asymmetries can be found in all sectors, yet the problems arising for financial intermediaries may be aggravated by the complexity of the bank business (Furfine, 2001; Levine, 2004; Morgan, 2002).”
Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence (2012, background): “The large and unsecured nature of deposits in the interbank market makes monitoring and therefore market discipline more important than in other types of bank deposit (Furfine, 2001).”
Board Size, Independence and Performance: An Analysis of Thai Banks (2007, neutral): “Third, the agency problems are particularly crucial for banks as they are opaque (Levine, 2003; Caprio and Levine, 2002) largely because of information asymmetries (Furfine, 2001).”
The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance (2007, background): “The opacity of banks’ loan portfolio generating intensified information asymmetry problems ( Furfine 2001; Levine 2004) and/or psychological factors may trigger the spread of isolated liquidity problems into the banking system.”
Lending relationships in the interbank market (2003, neutral): “In addition, borrowers with a higher proportion of non-performing loans tend to pay higher interest rates (Furfine, 2001).”
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, neutral): “As shown in Figure 7, there is a significant variation in the proportion of outside directors across European countries, from a very low ratio in Germany, to an extremely high one in countries such as the UK and the Netherlands.”
The corporate governance of banks (2003, neutral): “Furthermore, the large costs associated with monitoring managers accompanied by each small investors small stake in the firm may induce a “free-rider” problem: each investor relies on others to undertake the costly process of monitoring managers, so there is too little monitoring.”
Gender Diversity on European Banks’ Boards of Directors (2011, neutral): “In this regard, banks have two related characteristics that are specific to financial institutions and justify a separate analysis of their corporate governance (Andrés and Vallelado 2008): First, banks are generally more opaque than non-financial firms (Furfine 2001).”
The Effect of Board Size and Composition on the Efficiency of UK Banks (2011, neutral): “This moral hazard problem is particularly severe among banks as informational asymmetries are larger (Furfine, 2001 ).”
Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion (2003, neutral): “Furfine (2001) examines the determinants of interest rates on individual transactions.”
Corporate social responsibility and earnings management in U.S. banks (2014, background): “Their diversified financial operations and products, such as derivative financial instruments (Heilpern, Haslam, and Andersson, 2009; Lewis, 2009), are characterized by great opacity and information asymmetry (Furfine, 2001; Levine, 2004; Mulbert, 2009), which essentially complicates their financial”
Do Interbank Customer Relationships Exist? And How Did They Function in the Crisis? Learning from Italy (2012, neutral): “Furfine (2001) analyses the effects of interbank customer relationships (measured by different indexes) on the U.S. interbank interest rates, but he assumes but does not demonstrate their existence.”
Systemic Illiquidity in the Federal Funds Market (2007, background): “1 For empirical models of how credit quality affects interbank loan rates, see João Cocco, Francisco Gomes, and Nuno Martins (2005) and Furfine (2001).”
Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis (2011, background): “On the other side of the debate are scholars such as Furfine (2001) or Flannery and Sorescu (1996) who assume that participants in the interbank market have sufficient knowledge to differentiate between banks with good and bad credit and are able to provide liquidity to good banks.”