What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game

By James Andreoni, Marco E. Castillo, Ragan Petrie. 2003

110 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/748544438b0d4ca2515fa8eb9045942745e13fce

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Citations in the corpus

The Demand for Punishment (2007, background): “In a 49 second related project, Andreoni and co-workers (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Andreoni and 50 Miller, 2002; Andreoni et al., 2003) empirically recover utility functions that are based on social 51 preferences.”
A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, background): “Such an instrument check (Andreoni et al., 2003) is essential for the significance of the main part of our analysis.”
Contracts as Reference Points (2008, unknown): “For example, in the ultimatum game (see, e.g., Guth et al. (1982)), a suggested split of surplus by the proposer that is seen as “greedy” will often elicit retaliation in the form of rejection by the responder, even though this is costly for the responder. See Camerer and Thaler (1995) for a discuss”
More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, background): “In order to be able to infer preferences from decisions in a more suitable way Andreoni et al. (2003) convexify the decisions in an ultimatum game.”
Economic Theory and Experimental Economics (2005, background): “Andreoni and Samuelson (2003) report experimental results that explore, in a somewhat different setting, some of the key features of these models.”
Traditional trust measurement and the risk confound: An experiment in rural paraguay (2007, unknown): “2 In fact, Andreoni et al. (2003) found “unexpectedly” that risk aversion importantly affects play in ultimatum games as well.”