Contracts as Reference Points

By Oliver Hart, John. Moore. 2008

698 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ea7fa0257dc416cfd3472f18fe8e71c6e7ad820

Citations in the corpus

• Psychologists at the Gate: A Review of Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow (2012, unknown): “Hart and Moore (2008) believe that contracts serve as reference points for future negotiations.”
• The effect of reference point prices on mergers and acquisitions (2012, unknown): “…the 14D-9, I would add only the obvious: that Sun’s offer of $7.75 per share is significantly below the price at which our shares are trading today, which is at a 52-week high, and even further below the price that Sun paid to get blocks of Taro shares in recent private transactions with investors.”
• Investor attention, psychological anchors, and stock return predictability (2012, unknown): “…notable papers which study the effect of anchoring include Odean (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) on individual trading, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) on IPO underpricing, Hart and Moore (2008) on contracting, and Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) on mergers and acquisitions, among others.”
• Cognition and Incomplete Contracts (2009, unknown): “Note, though, that in recent interesting work, Hart and Moore (2008) do endogenize the degree of contractual incompleteness by introducing the behavioral feature of feelings of entitlement that make economic agents want to shade on performance when they feel shortchanged.”
• HOLD-UP, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND REFERENCE POINTS (2007, unknown): “…lead to different performance outcomes (depending on ownership structure), suggesting that noncontractible actions are important, see Januszewski Forbes and Lederman (2007). at V ienna U niversity L ibrary on February 23, 2012 http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from We make the…”
• Contracting for Complex Products (2010, unknown): “Contract completeness is the degree to which the contract defines buyers and sellers’ rights and obligations across all future contingencies (Hart & Moore 2008; Tirole, 1999; Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; Heinrich, 1999; Martin, 2004; O’Looney, 1998).”
• Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, unknown): “This explanation for contract “simplicity” has received attention in recent work by Hart and Moore (2008), Hart (2009), and Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2013).”