Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals
By M. Bradbury, Y. T. Mak, S. Tan. 2006
363 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/71afc8eadb7e47418424f2374837100536fccdd0
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In Accounting
- M. Muttakin
- Arifur Khan
- Emma García‐Meca
- J. P. Sánchez‐Ballesta
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In Strategy and Management
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- Arifur Khan
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Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis (2009, background): “While Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, and Kent (2005) find empirical support for the effective role of independent directors in constraining earnings management in Australian firms, Bradbury, Mak, and Tan (2006) in Singapore fail to find any association between earnings management and board independence.”
- Determinants of corporate financial performance relating to board characteristics of corporate governance in Indian manufacturing industry: An empirical study (2017, background): “On the other hand, Park and Shin (2004), Peasnall et al. (2005) and Bradbury et al. (2006) fail to report any association between earnings management and independence of the board.”
- Women directors, family ownership and earnings management in Malaysia (2016, background): “…between corporate governance characteristics and earnings management (see e.g. Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Bradbury et al., 2006; Hashim and Devi, 2008a, b; Mohd Saleh et al., 2005, 2007 for studies on Malaysia and Shen and Chih, 2007; Van Der Zahn and…”
- Audit committee characteristics and firm performance during the global financial crisis (2012, neutral): “(2004), Cotter and Silvester (2003), Klein (1998; 2002a; 2002b), Bradbury et al. (2006), Bronson et al.(2009), Sharma et al. (2009), and DeFond et al. (2005). variables are transformed to a binary form by assigning one where the variable is greater than or equal to the median for all companies and…”
- Corporate Governance Characteristics and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2011, background): “2001, Xie et al, 2003) or even no relation (Bradbury et al., 2006).”
- Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, background): “2005; Garcı́a Osma and Gill de Albornoz 2007; Bradbury et al. 2006; Jaggi et al. 2009). Most recent studies such as Price et al. (2006, 2007), Teitel and Machuga (2008), Chong et al.”
- Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from an Emerging Economy (2012, background): “The study reports a positive relationship between audit committee existence and financial reporting quality in emerging economies [for example, Bradbury et al. (2006), in Singapore and Malaysia; Rahman and Ali (2006) in Malaysia].”
- How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case (2020, background): “…results in reducing the chances of managing the earnings, which indicates a better quality of the financial information for making decisions (Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006; Davidson et al., 2005; Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009; Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005; Xie, Davidson Iii, &…”
- Corporate Governance and Audit Report Lag in Malaysia (2010, neutral): “In contrast, Abdul-Rahman and Mohamed-Ali (2006), Bradbury et al. (2006) and Abdullah et al. (2010) show that a CEO who also acts as a chairperson is not associated with earnings management or restatements in Malaysia.”
- Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality in Singapore (2015, methodology): “In practice, audit committees in Singapore may contain executive directors (including the CEO) and non-independent non-executive (i.e., affiliated or grey) directors before 2001 (Bradbury et al. 2006).”