Who Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and Firm Value

By Praveen Kumar, K. Sivaramakrishnan, Todd Milbourn, Dilip Mookherjee, John O'Brien, Madhav V. Rajan, Stefan Reichelstein. 2008

235 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7123c72455db5eb6b7d85259bf981443d55772aa

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Jiangyong Lu
2. Xiaohui Liu
3. A. Chizema
4. Lan Gao
5. Volker Laux
6. Igor Filatotchev
7. Yingqi Wei
8. Mike Wright

Citations in the corpus

• Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, unknown): “Finally, the board performs a contracting role (Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).”
• Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment (2012, background): “Substituting BFS = BSF = 0 and (29) into the incentive constraint (18) and rearranging yields”
• Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms (2015, background): “Drawing on agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), some of these studies have explored the relationship between executive compensation and the monitoring role of outside directors (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).”