Naked Exclusion: Comment

By Ilya Segal, M. Whinston. 2000

373 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6fc49ada9bb8a88a9eca182b9007c204c7c730ef

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Citations in the corpus

Games played through agents (2003, background): “There could also be externalities among buyers due to future competition, either because there are potential upstream entrants (Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) ) or because there are potential new buyers in noncoincident markets (Bernheim and Whinston (1998)).”
Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization (2007, background): “More recently, industrial organization economists have studied alternative models that demonstrate equilibrium incentives to foreclose more efficient potential entrants with exclusive contracts (Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Bernheim and Whinston, 1988; Rasmusen, Ramsey er, and Wiley, 1991; Segal and Whi”
Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets (2008, background): “…are judged according to the rule of reason in antitrust law.13 Some authors have suggested that exclusive dealing can be efficient (Marvel, 1982; Segal and Whinston, 2000a; Sass, 2005), whereas others have suggested that exclusive-dealing provisions may enable one firm to monopolize the market.”
Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition (2007, neutral): “ps,1(n = N − 1) = c+ (1− c)(N − 1)(2 + z(2N − 1))z 2 (1 + (N − 1)z)(2 +Nz)(2 +Nz − (N − 1)2z2) (16)”
Exclusivity and Control (2011, neutral): “Tirole (1988), Chapter 4. The “softening” of competition between platforms as a result of control delegation is in the spirit of the results seen in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), although here in an altogether different context.”
Exclusive Dealing and Entry When Buyers Compete (2006, methodology): “When buyers are independent monopolists, the results obtained by Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (1996, 2000) are replicated, and exclusive contracts prevent efficient entry.8 By contrast, we show that when downstream firms are Bertrand competitors, there exist only equilibria with…”