Public goods in networks

By Yann Bramoullé, Rachel Kranton. Journal of Economics Theory, 2007

642 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6f7047106bc6c4790239f8364f8caf9899243334

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Citations in the corpus

Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (2012, methodology): “In Table 2, we also report the estimation results of the selection-bias-corrected outcome equation (18) without exclusion restrictions (column 1), with the moral cost exclusion restriction (column 2), and with both the moral cost and outside option exclusion restrictions (column 3).”
Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities (2011, background): “A recent series of papers studies such games, e.g., Ballester et al. (2006), Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), Corbo et al. (2007), Galeotti and Goyal (2009).”
The Law of the Few (2010, methodology): “By contrast, with exogenous networks, Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) show that multiple equilibria typically exist and these equilibria exhibit very different levels of aggregate information acquisition as well as distributions.”
Networks, Shocks, and Systemic Risk (2015, background): “…hand, had we assumed that the interaction function f is decreasing, the players would have faced a network game of strategic substitutes, as in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) who study information sharing and the provision of local public goods.5 An important subclass of network games is the…”
Diffusion, Strategic Interaction, and Social Structure (2011, methodology): “It is based on a variation of (13), which is similar to a model analyzed by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007).”
An Overview of Social Networks and Economic Applications (2011, background): “Bramoullé and Kranton (2007b) provide an analysis of a class of such games, and show, among other things, that slight variations in network structure can lead to dramatic changes in equilibrium structure.”
Social capital access and entrepreneurship (2010, background): “…1985).3 Particularly, the access to social capital can facilitate information diffusion and technology adoption in the process of product creation (Bramoulle and Kranton, 2007), grant access to resources like labor or finance in the startup phase (Michelacci and Silva, 2007; Amit et al., 1990),…”
Communication and influence (2015, background): “The analysis of this game in a fixed network is performed in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), in which a set of varied possible equilibria are presented.”
Social Influence, Binary Decisions and Collective Dynamics (2008, background): “Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) have also recently studied a model of public good games, but in a social network framework.”
Social Activity and Network Formation (2015, background): “Other important contributions include Bramoullé and Kranton (2007), Belhaj et al. (2012), Bramoullé et al. (2014).”
Networks in Finance (2008, background): “In contrast, Bramoulle and Kranton (2005) study the formation of risk-sharing networks.”