SEC interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP financial measures

By Ana Marques. 2006

189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6dc6f9a64f90f1b0c193d411f1b51c2d37b19cdf

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In Accounting

1. Sarah E. McVay
2. Mark T. Soliman
3. Martin Walker
4. Theodore E. Christensen
5. Richard M. Frankel
6. Ervin L. Black
7. Richard D. Mergenthaler
8. Ilia D. Dichev

In Strategy and Management

1. Martin Walker
2. Sarah E. McVay
3. Mark T. Soliman
4. Theodore E. Christensen
5. Richard M. Frankel
6. Ilia D. Dichev
7. Vicki Wei Tang
8. Nilabhra Bhattacharya

Citations in the corpus

• Who Trades on Pro Forma Earnings Information (2004, methodology): “5 Marques (2006) uses a similar decomposition of earnings components.”
• Matching and the Changing Properties of Accounting Earnings over the Last 40 Years (2008, background): “It is instructive to consider that even after the recent crackdown on pro-forma earnings and the ensuing greater cost in using them, most preparers and users of financial information have modified but not abandoned their use (Marques 2006).”
• Sec Scrutiny and the Evolution of Non-Gaap Reporting (2008, unknown): “Indeed, Marques (2006), who examines the change in frequency of non-GAAP reporting, and Heflin and Hsu (2005), who examine changes in the likelihood that nonGAAP numbers exceed earnings benchmarks, have already employed two of these alternative techniques.”
• Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non-GAAP Reporting (2018, unknown): “Marques (2006) 2001-2003 2,475 1,759 Read quarterly earnings announcements for S&P 500 firms.”
• The Impact of the Sec's Regulation of Non-Gaap Disclosures (2008, unknown): “Using a smaller, hand-collected sample, Marques (2006) also finds a decline in nonGAAP disclosure frequency after the SEC regulations.”
• How far can we trust earnings numbers? What research tells us about earnings management (2013, background): “They find no evidence of investors being misled after Regulation G (see also Marques 2006).16 Overall, it appears that SOX and related SEC regulations reduced accruals-based EM and the abuse of non-GAAP earnings disclosures.”
• The Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings Information in the Presence of Transitory Gains (2014, unknown): “Following Regulation G fewer managers release non-GAAP earnings in their press rleases (Marques 2006; Entwistle et al. 2006), non-GAAP earnings are less likely to just reach analyst forecasts when GAAP earnings do not (Heflin and Hsu 2008), other exclusions tend to be less opportunistic and more…”
• Non-GAAP earnings and board independence (2011, background): “Several studies document a decline in the use of non-GAAP earnings immediately after the enactment of SOX and the issuance of Regulation G (e.g., Entwistle et al., 2006; Marques, 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2008).”
• Analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts and their implications for accounting research (2018, unknown): “Then, we utilize the more accurate                                                              8 These studies are: Bhattacharya et al. (2003); Bhattacharya et al. (2004); Lougee and Marquardt (2004); Marques (2006); Black and Christensen (2009); Chen (2010); Marques (2010); Frankel et al. (2011);…”