Media Ownership, Concentration and Corruption in Bank Lending

By Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin, Yue Ma. 2011

176 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), this study examines the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending using a unique World Bank data set covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries. We find strong evidence that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Media state ownership or media concentration also accentuates the positive link between banking concentration and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01e6cd87719a503fddb2043475e0e0108ea5ac96

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Chen Lin
2. Yue Ma
3. Frank M. Song
4. Jesús Seade
5. James R. Barth
6. F. González
7. Iftekhar Hasan
8. J. Klomp

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Chen Lin
2. Yue Ma
3. Jesús Seade
4. James R. Barth
5. Frank M. Song
6. G. Schepens

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Yue Ma
2. Chen Lin
3. Frank M. Song
4. James R. Barth
5. Jesús Seade
6. Vanessa S. Tchamyou

Citations in the corpus

• Collectivism and corruption in bank lending (2013, unknown): “Except for Barth et al. (2009), who do not report pseudo R2s, Beck et al. (2006) and Houston et al. (2011) report pseudo R2s around 0.05-0.06 in their main regressions.”
• New Evidence on the Role of the Media in Corporate Social Responsibility (2016, unknown): “Consistent with this idea, previous financial economics research finds thatmedia coverage reduces the private benefits of control (Dyck and Zingales 2004), corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Houston et al. 2011), insiders’ future trading profits (Dai et al.”
• Do Bank Regulation, Supervision and Monitoring Enhance or Impede Bank Efficiency? (2013, methodology): “Therefore, we follow the literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2009; Houston et al., 2011) and use legal origin, latitude, ethnic fractionalization, and the percentage of years that the country has been independent since 1776 as instrumental variables.”
• Corporate Socially Responsible Investments: CEO Altruism, Reputation, and Shareholder Interests (2014, unknown): “Similar to Houston et al. (2011), http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html for the G-Index.”