Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance

By Jay Shimshack, Michael B. Ward. 2005

398 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6c2c1dc88f973c6df1760c1f735a3710e8fa8cdd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Jay Shimshack
2. Wayne B. Gray
3. Michael B. Ward
4. Ronald J. Shadbegian
5. Amanda J. C. Sharkey
6. S. Pontoglio
7. René Kemp

In Strategy and Management

1. Jay Shimshack
2. Wayne B. Gray
3. Michael B. Ward
4. Amanda J. C. Sharkey
5. Patricia Bromley

Citations in the corpus

• The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence (2011, background): “General deterrence refers to the extent to which regulatory actions aimed at one facility generate spillover effects that impact the environmental performance at other facilities.11 Shimshack and Ward (2005) provided early evidence on the regulator reputation-building effects of general deterrence.”
• Can Ratings Have Indirect Effects? Evidence from the Organizational Response to Peers’ Environmental Ratings (2015, background): “In a related vein, Shimshack and Ward (2005) show how fining a few firms for water pollution led to a disproportionate reduction in pollution statewide, because it enhanced the regulator’s reputation for stringency.”
• The Environmental Performance of Polluting Plants: A Spatial Analysis (2007, background): “Jurisdictional boundaries provide another potentially important spatial factor connected with 1Studies on water pollution include Magat and Viscusi (1990), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Helland (1998), Shimshack and Ward (2005), Sigman (2002, 2004), and Gray and Shadbegian (2004).”
• Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations (2018, neutral): “We follow the literature (Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; Shimshack and Ward, 2005) in treating the self-reported data as accurate.17 We use this dataset to determine whether a plant is in compliance or a violator 13The EPA transitioned to a new reporting system after 2014.”
• Enforcement and over-compliance (2007, methodology): “Water pollutants for the U.S. pulp and paper industry are the focus of our analysis.”