Enforcement and over-compliance

By Jay Shimshack, Michael B. Ward. 2007

203 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eedef6ef197724fcd924a30f656630167372044e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Wayne B. Gray
2. Jay Shimshack
3. Bo Shen
4. Markus Kitzmueller
5. Chao Ma
6. Yuxia Peng
7. Yue‐Jun Zhang
8. Muhammad Shahbaz

In Strategy and Management

1. Wayne B. Gray
2. Jay Shimshack
3. Markus Kitzmueller
4. Yue‐Jun Zhang
5. Kyle T. Welch
6. Aaron S. Yoon
7. Shivaram Rajgopal
8. Hariom Manchiraju

Citations in the corpus

• The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence (2011, background): “However, Shimshack and Ward (2008) demonstrated that EPA enforcement actions not only reduced pollution by decreasing violations but also significantly increased overcompliance.”
• Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, background): “This leverage e¤ect of jointly determined pollutants has been addressed by Shimshack and Ward (2008), who conclude that under these circumstances observed overcompliance is driven by traditional regulatory incentives.”
• Can environmental innovation facilitate carbon emissions reduction? Evidence from China (2017, background): “Among various environmental innovation variables, market supervision and governmental regulation are increasingly deemed to reduce carbon emissions in relevant studies (Foulon et al., 2002; Shimshack and Ward, 2008; Zhao et al., 2015; Borghesi et al., 2015).”