The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives

By Alessandro Lizzeri, Nicola Persico. 2001

907 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6b23996427734fc1cfa5f0a85d7324d9f351e287

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Citations in the corpus

The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini (2009, background): “Lizzeri and Persico (2001) compare the composition of government spending under alternative electoral rules.”
An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games (2011, neutral): “Contributions in this line of research include Lizzeri (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Sahuguet and Persico (2006), Crutzen and Sahuguet (2009), and Kovenock and Roberson (2009).”
Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines (2017, background): “…may lead to clientelistic practices (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Stokes, 2005).1 If politicians prefer targeting specific voters with private goods, public goods will tend to be under-provided as a consequence (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001).”
Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938 (2006, background): “…participation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Boix, 2001) and in the election rule (Austen-Smith, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapters 8 and 9; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001) came about and how they might have affected fiscal outcomes.”
Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies (2011, background): “It is only as countries become richer that the relevance of ethnic networks and publicly provided private goods is reduced (Lizzeri and Persico (2001)).”
Distributive Politics Around the World (2013, neutral): “Drawing on theoretical work by Lizzeri & Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) hypothesize that where legislators are elected under proportional representation (PR), they will engage in programmatic politics, whereas their counterparts elected in single-member districts (SMDs) will focus…”
Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (2014, neutral): “θi(1−2δp+δ) g′(1−δp) + δ(p+δ−2δp) 1−δp ∂Vi ∂g′ − λ1i + λ2i [ θj g′(1−δp) + δ(1−p) 1−δp ∂Vj ∂g′ ] ≤ 0, (27) [ θi(1−2δp+δ) g′(1−δp) + δ(p+δ−2δp) 1−δp ∂Vi ∂g′ − λ1i + λ2i [ θj g′(1−δp) + δ(1−p) 1−δp ∂Vj ∂g′ ]] g′ = 0, (28)”
Female voting power: the contribution of women’s suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869–1960) (2008, background): “23See Lizzeri and Persico (2001) , Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chaps.”