The Effects of High Stakes High School Achievement Awards: Evidence from a Randomized Trial

By Victor Lavy, K. Eyal, Rema Hanna, A. Levkov, Nirupama Rao, Issi Romem, Daniel F McCaffrey, Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, David Card and 10 more. 2009

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The Israeli matriculation certificate is a prerequisite for most postsecondary schooling. In a randomized trial, we attempted to increase certification rates among low-achievers with cash incentives. The experiment used a school-based randomization design offering awards to all who passed their exams in treated schools. This led to a substantial increase in certification rates for girls but had no effect on boys. Affected girls had a relatively high ex ante chance of certification. The increase in girls' matriculation rates translated into an increased likelihood of college attendance. Female matriculation rates increased partly because treated girls devoted extra time to exam preparation. (JEL I21, I28, J16)

Subfields: Education, Safety Research, Statistics and Probability

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6aed7993c3a16dd02fc935026756f3a8a52c76d7

Citations in the corpus

• Why Do College Going Interventions Work (2017, unknown): “…with other interventions that have been shown to be more effective with women than men (see, for example: Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009; Angrist and Lavy 2009; and Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulos 2010) Overall we find that the mentoring treatment is largely acting as a substitute for…”
• Improving Education in Developing Countries (2016, unknown): “For example, Angrist and Lavy (2009) found that offering cash to students for passing the national high school exit exam in Israel in 2000 had no effect on the average passing rates of students.”
• The Production of Human Capital in Developed Countries: Evidence from 196 Randomized Field Experiments (2016, unknown): “[14] Angrist, Joshua, and Victor Lavy.”
• The Impact of High School Financial Education: Evidence from a Large-Scale Evaluation in Brazil (2016, unknown): “Perhaps the most well-known studies of monetary incentives for secondary school students are Angrist and Lavy (2009) and Angrist et al. (2002). In the first study, Israeli students were provided cash incentives to pass their graduation exams, and while the mean estimates are positive they are not st”
• The Causal Impact of Removing Children from Abusive and Neglectful Homes (2019, unknown): “…schooling and social program interventions can have larger positive impacts for girls (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Kling, Liebman, andKatz 2007; Angrist and Lavy 2009;Heckman, Pinto, and Savelyev 2013; Deming et al. 2014; Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond 2016; Garcia, Heckman, and Ziff 2018).”
• Robustness checks and robustness tests in applied economics (2014, unknown): “Of these, 23 perform a robustness check along the lines just described, using a variety of estimators suitable to the data, such as ordinary least squares, logit, instrumental variables, or panel methods (Adams et al., 2009; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009; Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009; Angrist and Lavy,”
• Do Differences in School's Instruction Time Explain International Achievement Gaps in Maths, Science and Language? Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries (2010, unknown): “J, P. Lang, and P. Oreopoulos, 2009, Angrist and Lavy, 2009), teachers’ incentives (Lavy, 2009).”
• Student Motivation and Associated Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis From Self-Determination Theory (2021, unknown): “This is highly notable as much of the past research on incentives, often stemming from economic and management domains of research, does not include measures of well-being, typically prioritizing student achievement (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Fryer, 2011).”
• Optimality of Matched-Pair Designs in Randomized Controlled Trials (2022, unknown): “For instance, in Angrist and Lavy (2009), the primary outcome variable of interest is a test score and the treatment is an educational program, so we expect a higher baseline test score (X) implies a higher endline test score (Y (1) and Y (0)) in expectation.”
• Behavioral Economics of Education: Progress and Possibilities (2015, unknown): “35 Panel A: Primary, middle or high schools Angrist and Lavy (2009) Achievement Awards demonstration: $1500 for passing the Israeli high school matriculation exam Administrative data for high school seniors from 40 lowperforming Israeli schools Field experiment (randomization at the school level)…”
• Student Awareness of Costs and Benefits of Educational Decisions: Effects of an Information Campaign and Media Exposure (2014, unknown): “October 2014”