Family Succession and Firm Performance: Evidence from Italian Family Firms
By M. Cucculelli, G. Micucci. 2008
482 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6ad4c06fcc86b351be9236b9b355b70868387662
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Alessandro Minichilli
- G. Corbetta
- Mario Daniele Amore
- Karl J. Wennberg
- Raphael Amit
- Belén Villalonga
- María‐Andrea Trujillo
In Economics and Econometrics
- Karl J. Wennberg
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Alessandro Minichilli
- G. Corbetta
- Mario Daniele Amore
- Eddy Laveren
- Johan Wiklund
- Vincent Molly
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Alessandro Minichilli
- G. Corbetta
- Karl J. Wennberg
- Mario Daniele Amore
- Raphael Amit
- Belén Villalonga
- María‐Andrea Trujillo
Citations in the corpus
- Governance of Family Firms (2015, result): “Cucculelli & Micucci (2008) find similar results for Italy.”
- Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, background): “…and the number of papers analysing the Italian case (Bandiera et al., 2008; Barba-Navaretti et al., 2008; Bianco et al., 2013; Bloom et al., 2008; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008; Destefanis and Sena, 2007; Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008; Giacomelli and Trento, 2005; Mengoli et al., 2009), no research…”
- Family Business Succession and Its Impact on Financial Structure and Performance (2010, background): “Because the alternative of hiring a better and more experienced external manager is often disregarded, these companies face a lack of managerial resources, which limits their ability to attain high performance (e.g., Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008).”
- How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, unknown): “…is associated with lower firm performance than is achieved when the task of managing a firm is passed to an outsider (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008): Compared with family CEOs, outsider CEOs have a stronger incentive to exhibit strong shortterm performance to the market…”