Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment
By Pat Barclay. 2006
319 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6a6f101bc194b52633fad206372526faf8020d0d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- E. Smith
- Jane O'Reilly
- Rob M. A. Nelissen
- Karl Aquino
- Pat Barclay
- D. Krupp
- Attila Szolnoki
- David G. Rand
In Safety Research
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- E. Smith
- Zhen Wang
- Stefano Boccaletti
- Rob M. A. Nelissen
- Jillian J. Jordan
- D. Krupp
In Sociology and Political Science
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Zhen Wang
- Stefano Boccaletti
- Jillian J. Jordan
- E. Smith
- David G. Rand
- Jane O'Reilly
Citations in the corpus
- The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment (2008, background): “, 2002b; Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000; Smith, Bliege Bird, & Bird 2003) and make them more attractive partners in subsequent interactions (Barclay, 2006).”
- A cue of kinship promotes cooperation for the public good (2008, background): “entail reputational consequences (Barclay, 2006).”
- Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans (2013, background): “Such attacks on cooperators' reputations may explain the fact that cooperators are often punished at non-zero levels in experimental tasks (e.g. Barclay, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gächter et al., 2006) or publicly criticized in field experiments (Barr, 2001).”
- Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “Moreover, evidence suggests that trustors showmore trust of trustees who have previously cooperated with others, implicating reputation effects [71,89,90].”
- A Model of Third Parties' Morally Motivated Responses to Mistreatment in Organizations (2011, background): “For example, in a series of dilemma game experiments, Barclay (2006) showed that third parties will bestow monetary benefits to those who punish free-riders.”
- Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation (2010, background): “punishing free riders rated punishers as being more trustworthy and worthy of respect than nonpunishers; only punishment directed at free riders brought monetary benefits, suggesting that people distinguish between justified and unjustified punishment and only respond to punishment with enhanced tru”