Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens?

By X. Debrun, Manmohan S. Kumar. 2007

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6024c1f5ec2052ce01c2ffc62e2aa1cad632d828

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Citations in the corpus

Rules and risk in the Euro area (2014, background): “…scal rules serve as commitment devices to e ectively tie the hands of governments not to pursue short-sighted and pro-cyclical budgetary policies (Debrun and Kumar, 2007b; Debrun et al., 2008), or whether they merely have a signalling role and remove information asymmetries between governments…”
Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability (2018, background): “In a context of imperfect information, rules can also be a signaling device by enhancing transparency and revealing the preferences and fiscal plans of the government to the public and financial markets (Debrun and Kumar 2007).”
Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, unknown): “Other empirical studies find that fiscal rules are associated with stronger fiscal performance (Corbacho and Schwartz, 2007; Debrun and Kumar, 2007; Debrun et al., 2008; Deroose et al., 2006; EC, 2006; Kopits, 2004).7 In addition, policymakers are making efforts to enhance the compliance with…”
Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis-Toward the 'Next-Generation' Rules: A New Dataset (2012, background): “…have been put forward to account the resulting deficit bias: governments’ shortsightedness (e.g., Rogoff, 1990) and the “common pool problem” since special interest groups or “constituencies” do not internalize the overall budgetary impact of their competing demands (see Debrun and Kumar, 2007).”
Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience (2013, unknown): “, Alt and Lowry 1994; Bohn and Inman 1996; Elder 1992; Poterba 1994; Shadbegian 1999; von Hagen 1991), European countries (see, e.g., Ayuso-i-Casals, et al. 2007; Debrun and Kumar 2007; Debrun, et al. 2008; European Commission 2006)and also Swiss cantons(see, e.”