Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

By John C. Harsanyi. 1973

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Citations in the corpus

Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods (2015, unknown): “First of all, note that we can “purify” the mixed-strategy equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1973) as we have a population of 58 different types of players in the α-β dataset.”
Arms Races and Negotiations (2004, background): “Harsanyi (1973) has shown that every Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is the limit of (pure strategy) Bayesian–Nash equilibria of any sequence of close-by incomplete information games with independent types.”
Long-term care and family bargaining (2002, background): “The bootstrap simulations discussed below equation (12) show that bias is small and statistically insigni.”
ON THE GLOBAL CONVERGENCE OF STOCHASTIC FICTITIOUS PLAY (2002, background): “2, which considers a logarithmic perturbation studied by Harsanyi (1973b), shows that such a reconstruction is not always possible.”
Discrete games with flexible information structures: an application to local grocery markets (2014, background): “The limit result of Harsanyi (1973) is apparent: as σν becomes small, the region of multiplicity closely resembles the “box” of multiplicity in the complete information game studied by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) and Tamer (2003).”
A Theory of Affirmative Action in College Admissions (2006, unknown): “According to Harsanyi (1973), almost all mixed strategy equilibrium can be approximated by the equilibrium of a nearby game with perturbed payoff.”
Quantal Response Equilibrium (2018, methodology): “Quantal response equilibrium: a structural definition • The original definition of QRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) adopts an approach in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973) and McFadden (1974) whereby the choice probabilities are rationalized by privately observed, mean zero random disturbances to the…”
Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (2003, background): “Harsanyi (1973) showed that for any mixed strategy equilibrium of a complete information game, if we added a small amount of independent payo¤ shocks to each player s payo¤s, the induced incomplete information game would have a pure strategy equilibrium that converged - in average behavior - to the…”