Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity

By Frank Heflin, Kenneth W. Shaw. 2000

400 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6843ca5d8a9b2fd4f19b41a469878360fb52f911

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Citations in the corpus

Do Liquidity Measures Measure Liquidity (2009, neutral): “Heflin and Shaw (2000), Lipson and Mortal (2004b), Lerner and Schoar (2004), and many others examine the influence of liquidity on capital structure, security issuance form, and other corporate finance decisions.”
Foreign Institutional Ownership and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from Indonesia (2009, neutral): “Heflin and Shaw (2000), Sarin et al. (2000), and Dennis and Weston (2001) all show that greater institutional ownership leads to larger spreads, the adverse selection components of the spread, and smaller quoted depths.”
Ownership Level, Ownership Concentration and Liquidity (2007, neutral): “To address this concern, we rely upon the work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Denis and Sarin (1999), Helfin and Shaw (2000), and Gompers and Metrick (2001) and add the following explanatory variables as instruments: quarterly equity return, leverage (long-term debt divided by market value of equity),…”
Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions (2009, neutral): “... earnings (Lee, Mucklow, and Ready 1993), M&A (Chae 2005), bankruptcy (Serednyakov 2002), dividend (Graham, Koski, and Loewenstein 2006), stock splits (Desai, Nimalendran, and Venkataraman 1998), bond rating (Chae 2005), and takeover (Jennings 1994) announcements, as well as analyst coverage (Bre”
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, background): “Heflin and Shaw (2000) document a negative correlation”
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration – Malaysian evidence (2018, background): “Larger shareholders have access to private value-relevant information (Heflin and Shaw, 2000), participate in setting corporate policy with managers (Davies, 2001) and can influence the process of nominating and electing directors (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, neutral): “Empirically, higher insider ownership reduces liquidity because it increases the probability of trading with an insider [Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (1999), Heflin and Shaw (2000)].”
National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, neutral): “…management discretion and ensure that decisions made by managers are accountable to shareholders by accessing private value-relevant information (Heflin & Shaw, 2000), engaging in corporate policy making with management (Bhagat, Black & Blair, 2004; Denis & McConnell, 2003), imposing influence…”
Corporate Governance and Tobin’s Q as a Measure of Organizational Performance (2018, neutral): “This monitoring is likely to give them the opportunity to secure better access to more reliable and relevant information, which, in turn, could help shareholders to make independent and more informed decisions (Heflin and Shaw, 2000).”
Block Ownership, Trading Activity, and Market Liquidity (2009, neutral): “3As discussed below, Heflin and Shaw (2000) is an exception.”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “tion and liquidity found by Heflin and Shaw (2000) and Rubin (2007).”