Ownership Level, Ownership Concentration and Liquidity

By Amir Rubin. 2007

315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5987d2042ca0fc32d056245690e34323870a506f

Citations in the corpus

• The effects of stock liquidity on firm value and corporate governance: Endogeneity and the REIT experiment (2015, unknown): “15 In addition, Amihud’s illiquidity is a widely used metric in many research areas for measuring stock illiquidity, such as asset pricing (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005), analyst disagreement (Sadka and Scherbina, 2007), ownership concentration (Rubin, 2007), dividend policy (Banerjee, Gatchev, and Sp”
• Who is the more overconfident trader? Individual vs. institutional investors (2011, unknown): “…studies have documented that stocks held by more institutional investors tend to experience higher returns and have larger firm size and higher trading volume (e.g., Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995), Sias and Starks (1997), Sias (2004), Rubin (2007), and Bailey, Cai, Cheung, and Wang (2009)).”
• Foreign Institutional Ownership and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from Indonesia (2009, unknown): “, 2004; Pinnuck, 2004; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Bushee and Goodman, 2007), and large institutional ownership increases the degree of information asymmetry (e.g. Dennis and Weston, 2001; Agarwal, 2007; Rubin, 2007; Brockman and Yan, 2009) and return volatility (e.”
• Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships (2012, unknown): “This is consistent 18 While we analyze both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, most of the previous research using the Amihud measure to measure market liquidity excludes NASDAQ stocks (e.g., Amihud (2002), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Rubin (2007)) .”
• Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “…of exit and investment, but they could also be 16 The negative impact on liquidity is consistent with the negative correlations between ownership concentration and liquidity found by Heflin & Shaw (2000) and Rubin (2007). consistent with a voice theory in which myopia is the main agency problem.”
• Block Ownership, Trading Activity, and Market Liquidity (2009, unknown): “7 In addition to reading original proxy statements, DFGM (2006) use a filtering process designed to determine actual beneficial ownership.”
• Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders (2011, unknown): “Smith and Swan(2008) show that institutional trading is successful at disciplining executive pay.”