Domain-Specific Knowledge Systems in the Brain: The Animate-Inanimate Distinction

By Alfonso Caramazza, J. Shelton. 1998

We claim that the animate and inanimate conceptual categories represent evolutionarily adapted domain-specific knowledge systems that are subserved by distinct neural mechanisms, thereby allowing for their selective impairment in conditions of brain damage. On this view, (some of) the category-specific deficits that have recently been reported in the cognitive neuropsychological literaturefor example, the selective damage or sparing of knowledge about animalsare truly categorical effects. Here, we articulate and defend this thesis against the dominant, reductionist theory of category-specific deficits, which holds that the categorical nature of the deficits is the result of selective damage to noncategorically organized visual or functional semantic subsystems. On the latter view, the sensory/functional dimension provides the fundamental organizing principle of the semantic system. Since, according to the latter theory, sensory and functional properties are differentially important in determining the meaning of the members of different semantic categories, selective damage to the visual or the functional semantic subsystem will result in a category-like deficit. A review of the literature and the results of a new case of category-specific deficit will show that the domain-specific knowledge framework provides a better account of category-specific deficits than the sensory/functional dichotomy theory.

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Citations in the corpus

Act-In: An integrated view of memory mechanisms (2014, background): “Double dissociations between semantic categories could first suggest that different stores or systems underlie these categories as proposed in the domain-specific knowledge approach (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998).”
Factors underlying category-specific semantic deficits (2001, background): “The resulting ratios can be found in Table 3 along with those of Caramazza and Shelton (1998), Devlin et al.”
Where do you know what you know? The representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain (2007, background): “There is considerable debate in the literature as to whether these two domains of conceptual knowledge are represented separately in the brai”
A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. (2008, unknown): “The central aspect of that hypothesis is that the way in which concepts are organized and represented is determined by the use to which those classes of mental representations have been, and are, put (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998).”
A SOCIAL-COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE ANALYSIS OF THE SELF (2002, background): “…preserved aspects of semantic memory is consistent with the idea that semantic memory can be fractionated into different components , each of which can be damaged independently (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Hodges & Patterson, 1997; Mackenzie Ross & Hodges, 1997; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).”
Grounding conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. (2003, background): “Alternative views stress other mechanisms [ 37 ,38] .A ll these mechanisms seem to be important and can be integrated into a single account, with modality-specific mechanisms playing a major role [13].”
Hypernetworks for Continual Semi-Supervised Learning (2021, unknown): “Further, the memory is consolidated periodically, helping humans to learn continually [Cara-a mazza and Shelton, 1998; Wilson and McNaughton, 1994; Alvarez and Squire, 1994].”
Visual illusion induced by sound. (2002, background): “…James A. Russell, and Daniel Tranel Evolutionary explanations have been offered for a variety of apparently domain-specific cognitive processes, including retrieval of knowledge about concrete entities (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) and reasoning about social exchange (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992).”
Neural systems behind word and concept retrieval. (2004, background): “One reason for this dual approach was to preempt the criticism that the classification into normal/abnormal categories based on 2 SD from the mean of a normal matched control group provides an arbitrary dichotomy (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Saffran & Sholl, 1999).”
A common, high-dimensional model of the representational space in human ventral temporal cortex (2011, background): “Large-scale topographic features that are fairly consistent across individuals reflect coarser categorical distinctions, such as animate versus inanimate categories in lateral to medial VT cortex (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Chao et al., 1999; Hanson et al., 2004; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008b; Mahon ”
Category-specific organization in the human brain does not require visual experience (2009, unknown): “The bar graphs depict the estimates for BOLD responses for animal and nonliving stimuli within those ROIs, for all datasets (collapsing across all voxels within the ROI).”