Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Taxes

By Javier Bianchi, Enrique G. Mendoza. 2010

201 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/66a320b7b774ec9196c8aed2a43e36542ec1259e

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Citations in the corpus

Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates (2012, unknown): “A related strand of work emphasizes pecuniary externalities that work through prices in borrowing constraints, for example Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Korinek (2011).”
House Prices, Credit Growth, and Excess Volatility: Implications for Monetary and Macroprudential Policy (2013, background): “14 Another macroprudential policy approach, examined by Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), is to employ a procyclical tax on debt which leans against overborrowing by rational private-sector agents.”
Optimal Capital Controls and Real Exchange Rate Policies: A Pecuniary Externality Perspective (2015, unknown): “3 See also Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2013) and Benigno et al. (2013).”
Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked? (2014, background): “39See Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) and Jeanne and Korinek (2012) for models in which pecuniary externalities due to fire sales give a rationale for ex ante prudential policy.”
Financial regimes and uncertainty shocks (2019, background): “…Models where agents face occasionally binding borrowing or collateral constraints offer a natural way to think about this form of state-dependence (Mendoza and Smith, 2006; Mendoza, 2010; Bianchi and Mendoza 2010; Bianchi, 2011; He and Krishnamurty 2012, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014).”
Addressing Household Indebtedness: Monetary, Fiscal or Macroprudential Policy? (2017, unknown): “To capture cost-push shocks on wages, we specify an exogenous AR(1) process on θw,t = ηn,t/(ηn,t − 1) as log θw,t = (1− ρw) log θw + ρw log θw,t−1 + εw,t, (7)”
Capital Flows and Foreign Exchange Intervention (2019, unknown): “See for example Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2009), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Korinek (2011).”
Which Financial Frictions? Parsing the Evidence from the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009 (2013, background): “Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) study a quantitative model of systemic risk, where agents do not take externalities of fi nancial fragility on others into account.”
Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach (2019, unknown): “The assumption that debt is uncontingent can be justiﬁed e.g. on the basis that shocks to borrowers are not veriﬁable and cannot be used to condition payments.”
What do we know about the effects of macroprudential policy (2018, unknown): “The borrowing constraint is occasionally binding, depending on private agents’ and policymakers’ choices, which determine the state of the economy (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2012; Benigno et al., 2013).”
Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies (2017, background): “…risk taking and the volume of credit can also be found in a number of contributions that abstract from monetary policy [e.g., Bianchi (2010), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010)] or from prudential policy [Benigno et al. (2011)]: in these contributions, this occurs through…”
Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default (2014, unknown): “subject to the budget constraint of the dynasty, ct + q H t h m t − bt ≤ wtl t + μ 1− Γ μ xt R t+1 ¶¶ R t+1q H t h m t , (10)”