Optimal Capital Controls and Real Exchange Rate Policies: A Pecuniary Externality Perspective

By Gianluca Benigno, Huigang Chen, Christopher Otrok, Alessandro Rebucci, Eric R. Young. 2015

135 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aaca96cf3674b77e4cf6897457d6620ea3d2eef8

Citations in the corpus

• Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View (2018, unknown): “One strand in this literature motivates capital controls from pecuniary externalities, as first analzyed by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003). Our approach differs from theirs in two respects: First, building on Korinek (2007), the pecuniary externalities in our framework arise from changes i”
• Managing credit booms and busts: A Pigouvian taxation approach (2019, unknown): “Korinek (2010, 2018) , Bianchi (2011) and Benigno et al. (2016) analyze models in which the collateral constraint involves the real exchange rate and characterize the optimal taxation of capital inflows for an emerging market economy.”
• Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash (2020, unknown): “This argument has been developed in greater detail in Benigno et al. (2012). Case (ii) captures an economy in which government revenue is costly but there is no other distortion such as systemic risk in financial markets.”