Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?
By Frank Smets. 2014
379 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2cd68e26fca33a7eee67da61d5aaccfc299658cc
Citations in the corpus
- The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset (2018, unknown): “Smets (2014), for example, suggests that in order to avoid the time-inconsistency problem and to ensure clear accountability, it is important that price stability remains the monetary authorities’ primary objective.”
- Monetary Policy, Financial Conditions, and Financial Stability (2014, unknown): “Conceptually, incentive problems between price stability and financial stability could arise if clear priorities are not set (Smets 2013).”
- Monetary Transmission through Shadow Banks (2018, unknown): “Prior to the 2008–09 financial crisis, the consensus among policy makers was that monetary authority should focus on price stability and employment (Smets 2013).”
- Macroprudential Rules and Monetary Policy when Financial Frictions Matter (2015, unknown): “As discussed in Bank of England (2015) and Smets (2014), although there is a growing literature that explores how monetary and macroprudential policies might be co-ordinated, there is no consensus yet on whether monetary policy should take into account fi nancial stability considerations.”
- Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies (2017, unknown): “capital accumulation: x = (1− δ)k + i; (40) loans: l = x; (41) technology: k = ξ1(κ)x; (42) zero-profit condition for safe capital-goods producers:”