Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions

By Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta, K. Raman. 2001

629 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/669b9065738a27048308999656d8284ad1d48535

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Citations in the corpus

Deviation from the Target Capital Structure and Acquisition Choices (2011, positive): “In order to incorporate the effect of transaction value, I normalize the transaction value by the market value of acquirer (Datta et al, 2001).”
Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Performance: The Case of Acquiring CEOs (2007, neutral): “These returns are larger in magnitude than Datta et al.’s sample, but are more comparable to Grinstein and Hribar’s sample of large deals. The method of payment in 79% of our sample is bidder equity, which generally results in lower average abnormal returns (Travlos (1987)).”
Shareholder Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control (2005, positive): “Datta et al., (2001) show that high levels of equity-based compensation (EBC), defined as the Black–Scholes value of recently awarded options, provide the stronger incentives for managers to engage in value-creating acquisitions.”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers (2013, positive): “Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) show that firms with better-designed compensation schemes make better merger decisions since managers whose interests are more aligned to those of shareholders undertake better mergers.”
CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses (2004, background): “Denis et al. (1997) and Datta et al. (2001) look at CEO compensation and ownership structures before M&A deals, and show that increased insider ownership and equity-based compensation improve longrun post-acquisition performance.”
Corporate investment efficiency: The role of financial development in firms with financing constraints and agency issues in OECD non-financial firms (2019, background): “Conflict between managers and shareholders can be minimized by linking the compensation of CEOs with the stock performance of the firm (Datta et al., 2001; Kang et al., 2006).”
What S in it for Me? Ceos Whose Firms are Acquired (2004, background): “A recent example is Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001), who find a link between incentive compensation and the results of firms' acquisitions.”
Industry contagion in loan spreads (2012, neutral): “ 11 Following the recent literature (e.g., Datta et al., 2001), we define acquisition premiums (Acquisition premium_4w) as the ratio of the offer price to the target’s stock price four weeks prior to the initial announcement date minus one.”
Learning, Hubris and Corporate Serial Acquisitions (2009, neutral): “Empirical evidence points toward a connection between the two (see, e.g., Datta et al., 2001) but this is beyond the scope of the present analysis; -”
The Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers (2012, positive): “Taken together, the results are certainly consistent with the proposition that a preponderance of ATPs is a reasonable proxy for managerial entrenchment (Goyal and Park, 2002; Yermack, 1996; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Core and Guay, 2002).”
Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis (2011, background): “…(Roll, 1986), means of payment in the context of asymmetric information (Hansen, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Eckbo et al., 1990; Dasgupta and Tsui, 2004; DeMarzo et al., 2005), features of (formal or informal) auctions held by companies (Hansen, 2001), and M&A waves (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan,…”
Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes (2011, positive): “Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) provide evidence that governance mechanisms (e.g., executive stock options) that effectively align shareholder-manager incentives lead to more profitable acquisition decisions.”