Abstraction in perceptual symbol systems.

By Lawrence W. Barsalou. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2003

422 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cultural Studies, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/648b8f485abb09c82fe8efb1ef35e212909e63d2

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Citations in the corpus

Abstract concepts: sensory-motor grounding, metaphors, and beyond (2011, background): “Most of the evidence supporting the grounded cognition framework focused on representations of concrete concepts (e.g., objects; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003) or actions (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).”
TRoPICALS: a computational embodied neuroscience model of compatibility effects. (2010, background): “passive, “contemplative”, view of knowledge, that has a long philosophical tradition, is increasingly challenged by recent studies which suggest that visual perception and action are closely interdependent and that the way organisms represent the world depends not only on sensory stimuli per se but ”
Situating Abstract Concepts (2004, background): “Such concepts pose a classic problem for theories that ground knowledge in modality-specific systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003a,b).”
Perceptual Learning, Cognition, and Expertise (2013, background): “(Barsalou, 2003, p. 1179) Barsalou contrasts this view with what he sees as the more typical view in cognitive science that information gotten through perception is “transduced” into amodal representations, where … an amodal symbol system transduces a subset of a perceptual state into a completely…”
Words as tools and the problem of abstract words meanings (2009, background): “According to a third view, proposed by Barsalou et al. (Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), abstract concepts differ from concrete ones as they derive from simulations of internal states rather than of external ones.”
The contents of long-term memory and the emergence of knowledge (2009, neutral): “There is no need to undertake an exhaustive review of these studies (see, for example, Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2005; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; Mandler, 1992; Pulvermüller, 1999; Versace, Nevers, & Padovan, 2002).”
Embodiment in Attitudes, Social Perception, and Emotion (2005, methodology): “We address each briefly in turn (for further detail, see Barsalou, 1999, 2003b).”
Categorization theory and research in consumer psychology: category representation and category-based inference (2008, background): “…in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that representations in modal ity-specific systems underlie conceptual knowledge (for reviews of relevant empirical findings, see Barsalou, 2003b; Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; Martin, 2001; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005).”
Varieties of abstract concepts and their multiple dimensions (2019, methodology): “02014 Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Abstraction in perceptual symbol systems. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 358(1435), 1177–1187. Barsalou, L. W., Dutriaux, L. & Scheepers, C. (2018). Moving beyond the distinction between concrete and abstract con”
Semantic feature production norms for a large set of living and nonliving things (2005, methodology): “…2001), categorization (Hampton, 1979; Smith et al., 1974), and conceptual combination (Hampton , 1997; Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988), and have been used to provide support for modality-specific aspects of representation (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou , 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001).”
The proactive brain: memory for predictions (2009, background): “…for this notion that sensory information interacts with existing representations for the purpose of perception proper is related to the concept of embodied cognition (Barsalou 2003; Noe 2005), and has been recently supported by functional magnetic resonance imaging studies (Wang & Jiang 2008).”