Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply

By Pierre-Andre Chiappori, B. Fortin, Guy Lacroix. Journal of Political Economy, 2002

1,061 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Gender Studies, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/642cd141cf4e11d9d2b77b1cd723e4d15d9741b8

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Citations in the corpus

Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty (2020, background): “Chiappori et al. (2002), for example, use US divorce laws as distribution factors to study intra-household bargaining and labor supply, while Voena (2015) examines how divorce laws affect couples’ intertemporal choices in a dynamic model of household decision-making.”
Divorce Law and Women's Labor Supply (2008, positive): “In contrast, Chiappori, Fortin, and LaCroix (2002) estimated a structural model in which divorce laws enter by shifting the bargaining positions of the spouses.”
The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage (2003, background): “Evidence in favor of this has been found in the context of labor supply (Gray (1998), Chiappori et al (2002)), spousal homicide and domestic violence (Stevenson and Wolfers (2003), Dee (2003)), and investments into marital specific capital 29 For example, Choo and Siow (2003) derive a statistic to…”
Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples? (2015, positive): “I then use the simulated data to estimate the below equations for each spouse j = H,W : log(y) = κ + μlog(c) + ν Xit + j it (11) log(cjit) = χ j + ηDivorcedit + ψ Xt + υ j it (12) The coefficient μ captures the degree to which spouse’s j income shocks, which are assumed to be permanent, are transmit”
Sharing of Resources Within the Family and the Economics of Household Decision Making (2013, background): “• The sex ratio, the proportion of men to women in the population, has been found to have a positive impact on the woman’s allocation resulting from the sharing rule in many, but not all, studies (Chiappori et al., 2002; Grossbard-Shechtman & Neuman, 1988).”
Household bargaining and excess fertility: An experimental study in Zambia. (2014, methodology): “We begin by deriving predictions based on a collective bargaining model (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori et al., 2002), with the fundamental assumption that spouses can bargain efficiently.”
Women's Inheritance Rights and Intergenerational Transmission of Resources in India (2013, neutral): “…and conditions in the marriage market (sex ratios) points in the same direction: for U.S. data, the unitary model is rejected in favor of a bargaining model and fi nds that passage of a divorce law favorable to women is equivalent to a signifi cant asset transfer to females (Chiappori et al. 2002).”
Spousal influences on parents’ non-market time choices (2007, background): “…threat point models of McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980), the collective framework models of Chiappori and colleagues (Chiappori, 1988; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002), or in the separate spheres threat point of Lundberg and Pollak (1993).”
Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification (2006, methodology): “This strategy has been used in a number of empirical papers (e.g. Chiappori et al., 2002).”
It’s Raining Men! Hallelujah? The Long-Run Consequences of Male-Biased Sex Ratios (2019, background): “…exploiting migration-induced variation in sex ratios, several studies find that male-biased sex ratios are associated with higher marriage rates and a decline in labor force participation and in hours worked by women (Grossbard-Shechtman and Neideffer 1997, Angrist 2002, Chiappori et al. 2002).”
Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power (2003, methodology): “For our empirical application, we assume singles demands have the integrable QUAIDS functional form described in equations (7), (8), (9), (10), (16) and (17).”
Labor market opportunities and women's decision making power within households (2016, background): “There are other papers that have looked at the effects of divorce laws and women’s rights after divorce to analyze women’s utility within marriage (e.g. Gray 1998; Chiappori et al. 2002; Rangel 2006; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006).”